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vABSTRACT
The main purpose of a power system is to deliver the electrical energy requirements of its
customer, at the lowest possible cost and at an adequate level of reliability.  A power system
may be divided into three sub systems: generation, transmission and distribution. Each sub
system plays a different role for the entire network.
The distribution sub-system in South Africa, much like many other countries in the world, is still
based on 20th century technology. According to some sources, 20th century technology cannot
efficiently sustain a 21st century economy, and that power networks need to be ‘modernized’.
A report released in 2007 by the National Energy Regulator of South Africa (NERSA) on the state
of the Electricity Distribution Industry (EDI) infrastructure, indicated that although there were
pockets of good performance, assets needed urgent rehabilitation and investment. Further
studies have revealed that the distribution grid infrastructure is aging and poorly maintained,
and that its state was steadily deteriorating. Ageing infrastructure has been identified as the key
challenge for the electricity generation, transmission and distribution sectors. It has also been
estimated that between 2012 and 2020, more than 250 billion (2008) ZAR will be needed to
maintain and expand the transmission and distribution network infrastructure.
Smart grid technologies have been proposed as one of the possible means of implementing new
technologies and techniques into the grids of different countries. The main motive towards
smart grid technologies is to improve reliability, flexibility, accessibility and profitability; as well
as to support trends towards a more sustainable energy supply.
Besides aging infrastructure, inadequate generation capacity has also been a problem faced by
the industry. Since 2007, South Africa has faced electricity supply problems due to inadequate
generation capacity, which culminated in rolling black outs and load shedding in 2007 and 2008.
The main causes of the blackouts were: insufficient generation capacity to meet growing
demand, unreliable transmission and distribution networks, as well as inadequate operation of
existing plants. Traditionally, generation capacity has not been present in the distribution zone.
However, due to technological developments in distributed generation technology; constraints
ont he construction of new transmission lines and grid infrastructure; increased customer
demand for highly reliable electricity; and environmental concerns; the presence of generation
in the distribution subsystem has increased.
This dissertation, entitled BENEFITS OF SMART GRID TECHNOLOGIES IN SOUTH AFRICA, aims to
show the potential reliability benefit of smart grid technologies and distributed generation.
There are a variety of smart grid technologies available on the market, each aimed at improving
different aspects of power system performance. Smart grid technologies, which are said to
improve distribution feeder reliability, were identified and selected in this study. These are fault
passage indicators, distance to fault estimators and feeder automation. Distributed generation
in the form of solar PV was also introduced into the study.
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In order to determine the potential reliability benefit of the identified smart grid and DG
technologies, an experiment was designed and setup. A feeder from the Roy Billinton Test
System (RBTS)was selected and used for the analysis. The effect of aging infrastructure was
modelled into the system, as this is the greatest challenge facing the South African power
distribution network. The identified smart grid technologies and distributed generation were
then integrated in the system and their impact on reliability was evaluated. The reliability worth
of the different technologies was also determined and this was used to conduct a cost/benefit
analysis regarding the economic feasibility of the technologies.
From the research findings, a number of key conclusions were drawn.  An important conclusion
was that the added technologies had no impact on the frequency of interruptions and made no
contribution towards decreasing the frequency of interruptions. It was however noted, that
implementation of feeder automation saw a decrease in the frequency of sustained
interruptions (interruptions longer than 5 minutes) and an increase in the experienced
momentary interruptions (interruptions longer than 3 seconds but no longer than 5 minutes).
Another key observation was that the frequency of interruptions was directly related to the
state of the infrastructure. The presence of aged and worn out transformers on the system
increased the average failure rate of the system by about 20%.
The added technologies did contribute towards decreasing the outage duration experienced by
customers on the feeder. Despite the addition of the different identified smart grid
technologies, the greatest decrease in outage duration was experienced when the system
infrastructure is not aged. This points towards the importance of addressing the underlying
issues of the system before attempting to implement more advanced technological systems.
The financial feasibility of implementing the identified technologies was also considered. The
greatest saving in interruption costs arose when the aged transformers were replaced with new
ones. In most cases, the payback periods for the investments were extremely lengthy and would
most likely be deemed unfeasible by the investor. The most feasible payback period was
experienced when new transformers were installed in the system. An investment which would
need to be done nonetheless in the long run as eventually the worn out transformers would get
to a point where they fail completely is not replaced. A sensitivity analysis conducted on the
payback period of the investments also strongly brought out the fact that the greatest
contributor to the interruption costs experienced on the network was as a result of the and not
the lack of more modern technologies.
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xiii
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Page | 1
1 INTRODUCTION
This chapter introduces the state of the current South African power distribution system and
outlines the challenges it is currently facing. It introduces smart grid techniques as a potential
solution to improve the performance of the network. This chapter also identifies the hypothesis
to be tested and describes the approach adopted in conducting the research.
1.1 BACKGROUND
1.1.1 Smart grid technologies, what are they?
The term 'smart grid' refers to a class of technologies that are being developed and used by
utilities to deliver electrical systems into the 21st century using computer-based remote control
and automation. These technologies are believed to improve the reliability, resilience, flexibility,
and efficiency (both economic and energy) of the electric delivery system [NELT, 2007b].
1.1.2 The state of the South African power network
The distribution sub-system in South Africa, much like many other countries in the world, is still
based on 20th century technology [DBSA, 2012]. According to some sources, 20th century
technology cannot efficiently sustain a 21st century economy, and power networks need to be
‘modernized’ [NELT, 2007b; SANEDI, 2012a]. A report released in 2007 by the National Energy
Regulator of South Africa (NERSA) on the state of the Electricity Distribution Industry (EDI)
infrastructure, indicated that although there were pockets of good performance, assets needed
urgent rehabilitation and investment [NERSA, 2007].A study conducted in 2008 by the EDI
Holdings on the state of the distribution grid of the country, revealed that the distribution grid
infrastructure was aging and poorly maintained, and that its state was steadily deteriorating.
The study estimated that the maintenance, refurbishment and strengthening backlog in the
distribution grid amounted to about 27.4 billion 2008 South African Rand (2008 ZAR). This
backlog was growing at an alarming rate of 2.5 billion ZAR per annum [EDI Holdings, 2008]. The
same study pointed out that the current practices in the EDI do not promote business
sustainability and economic growth. It also highlighted the fact that the increased use of an
under-maintained distribution grid could be a potential risk to the industry.
A more recent report released in 2012 by the Development Bank of South Africa (DBSA) on the
State of South Africa’s Economic Infrastructure, identified ageing infrastructure as the key
challenge for the electricity generation, transmission and distribution sectors. The other
challenges faced in the South African power industry include: poor performance networks,
shortage of generation capacity, significant infrastructure backlog, ageing work force, inability to
effectively introduce renewable energy options into the grid, and the inability to effectively
introduce demand response strategies [SANEDI, 2012b].
It has been estimated that between 2012 and 2020, more than 250 billion (2008) ZAR will be
needed to maintain and expand the transmission and distribution network infrastructure
[SANEDI, 2012b; DBSA, 2012].
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1.1.3 Smart grid technologies: A potential solution?
Smart grid technologies have been proposed as one of the possible means of implementing new
technologies and techniques into the grids of different countries [SANEDI, 2012a]. The main
motive towards smart grid technologies is to improve reliability, flexibility, accessibility and
profitability; as well as to support trends towards a more sustainable energy supply [Slootweg,
2009].
There have been a number of smart grid demonstration and deployment efforts internationally.
Many governments have invested financially into these initiatives and a few examples are
provided in Table 1-1 below. The outcome of these initiatives is yet to be published.
Table 1-1 National smart grid demonstration and deployment efforts [IEA, 2011]
Country National smart grid initiatives
China The Chinese government has developed a large, long-term stimulus plan to invest
substantially in smart grids. Smart grids are seen as a way to reduce energy
consumption, increase the efficiency and manage electricity generation from
renewable technologies. China’s State Grid Corporation outlined plans in 2010 for
a pilot smart grid programme that maps out deployment to 2030. Smart grids
investments will reach at least 96 billion US Dollars (USD) by 2020.
France By 2011, the electricity distribution operator of France, ERDF, had already started
deploying about 300 000 smart meters in a pilot project based on an advanced
communication protocol named Linky. If the pilot is deemed a success, ERDF
intendsto replace all of its 35 million meters with Linky smart meters by 2016.
Italy In 2011 the Italian regulator (Autorità per l’Energia Elettricaedil Gas) awarded
eight tariff-based funded projects on active medium voltage distribution systems,
to demonstrate at-scale advanced network management and automation
solutions necessary to integrate distributed generation. The Ministry of Economic
Development also granted over 200 million Euro (EUR) for the demonstration of
smart grids features and network modernization in the Southern Italian regions.
Japan In 2011, the Federation of Electric Power Companies of Japan started developing a
smart grid that incorporates solar power generation with a government
investment of over USD 100 million.  The Japanese government also announced a
national smart metering initiative and large utilities have announced smart grid
programmes.
South
Korea
The South Korean government launched a USD 65 million pilot programme in
partnership with their power industry on Jeju Island. The pilot consists of a fully
integrated smart grid system for 6 000 households, wind farms and four
distribution lines. Korea has announced plans to implement smart grids
nationwide by 2030.
United
States of
America
USD 4.5 billion was allocated to grid modernization under the American Recovery
Reinvestment Act of 2009, including: USD 3.48 billion for the quick integration of
proven technologies into existing electric grids, USD 435 million for regional smart
grid demonstrations, and USD 185 million for energy storage and demonstrations.
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Smart grids have many attractive features; among these include [Uluski, 2010; Ton et al., 2011;
Huang et al., 2012]:
 Their ability to self-heal, which make them more resilient to disturbances on the
network.
 They incorporate two way real time communication between the consumer and the
utility
 They allow for the easy integration and management of energy storage schemes,
distributed generation and renewable energy sources such as solar and wind (of which a
large potential exists in South Africa) [Albert Molderink et al., 2009].
In order to maintain the quality of electricity supply, ensure stability of the electricity network,
minimise electricity load shedding and avoid blackouts, the DME published regulation 773 in
terms of section 35 of National Electricity Regulation act in 2008. Regulation 773 requires all
end users with a monthly electrical energy consumption of 1000kWh and more to install a smart
system. A smart system referring to an electricity meter that allows for:  the measurement of
consumed energy on a time interval basis, two-way communication between the end user and
the licensee, storage of interval data and transfer it remotely to the licensee and remote load
management. The installation of this smart system was to be completed by 01 January 2012
[DME, 2008]. Though this regulation has been in effect since 2008, the specified timeframe and
details regarding smart grid and time of use tariff implementation as allowed for in the
regulation was under review in March 2013 [SANEDI, 2013].
Whether or not smart grid technologies are the solution to the major problems the South
African power distribution industry faces, is yet to be completely tested. By the end of 2012,
apart from Regulation 773 of the National Electricity Regulation Act, there was no other policy
advocating for the implementation of smart grid techniques, and therefore a great bulk of the
anticipated 250 billion (2008) ZAR financial investment will most likely be spent on 20th century
technology [SANEDI, 2012a]. The South African Smart Grid Initiative (SASGI) was established in
May 2012 and is an industry forum established under the guidance of SANEDI and chaired by the
Department of Energy. The main objectives of SASGI are to facilitate cooperation, to contribute
to policy formulation, to provide guidance in the establishment of standards, identify technology
functionality and to provide leadership in the deployment of appropriate technology.
This research project will therefore investigate the benefit of smart grid techniques in terms of
reliability improvement, and conduct a cost/benefit analysis of whether these techniques could
be a potential solution to the major problem(s) within the industry. This will help determine
whether the anticipated financial investment between 2012 and 2020 of about 250 million ZAR
should potentially be invested in smart grid technologies.
1.2 POWER SYSTEM RELIABILITY
Reliability may be defined as the probability of a system performing its required tasks
adequately for a period of time and under set operating conditions [Billinton & Allan, 1992]. This
definition in itself highlights the uncertainty surrounding the ability of the power system to
perform as desired. Therefore, the purpose of power system reliability evaluation is to try and
quantify the reliability of a system for planning and decision making.
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The reliability of a power system may be divided into two: system adequacy and system
security. System adequacy concerns the existence of sufficient facilities within the power system
to meet the demands of the customers. On the other hand system security encompasses the
ability of the network to respond to any disturbances.
While it is helpful to know the events which cause the unreliability of a system, the more
important issue is to know and understand the impact of these events on the power system.
Reliability indices are therefore introduced as a means of quantifying and assessing the
reliability of the power system. Reliability indices measure the frequency, duration and severity
of disturbances on the network [Fong & Grigg, 1994; Reppen & Feltes, 2001; Edimu, 2009].
Utilities take note of these indices and use them to determine power system reliability for a
particular area [Brown, 2006]. These indices shall be discussed in more detail in chapter 2.
Several techniques have been developed and used to evaluate power system reliability and to
quantify reliability indices. These are grouped into deterministic and probabilistic approaches.
Deterministic approaches simply use past experiences to predict the future operation of the
system. They are generally simple to implement and easy to understand but generally result in
over-designed and uneconomic solutions [Pereira & Balu, 1992; Reppen & Feltes,
2001].Probabilistic techniques on the other hand, incorporate the stochastic and random nature
of the power system and are able to take into account inherent unplanned events [Reppen &
Feltes, 2001].
1.3 APPLICATION OF RELIABILITY EVALUATION TECHNIQUES
As already mentioned, a power system may be divided into three: generation, transmission and
distribution. Hierarchical levels (HL1 –HL3), shown in Figure 1-1,were identified as functional
blocks in order to ensure consistency in the application of power system reliability evaluation
[Billinton & Allan, 1992]. Reliability indices may be evaluated in each hierarchical level and used
by planners and operators to develop strategies and to make decisions [Kim & Singh, 2009].
Figure 1-1 Hierarchical levels of power system [Billinton & Allan, 1992]
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Hierarchical level 1 (HL1) represents the generation zone where electrical energy is produced
from primary energy sources, such as coal, wind, solar and hydro energy. Hierarchical level 2
(HL2), which is commonly referred to as the composite zone or system, consists of the
generation and transmission zones combined. Both the transmission and distribution zones are
responsible for transporting electrical power, whereby the distribution sub-system transmits to
customer points. Hierarchical level 3 (HL3) refers to the entire system or generally for easier
analysis, the distribution zone and its facilities [Billinton & Allan, 1988].
An interruption or disturbance in any hierarchical level has an impact on the electricity
availability to a number of customers on the network. In most cases the interruptions in the
distribution zone are more frequent compared to those of the other zones. However an event
causing an interruption in the distribution zone does not affect as many customers as a
disturbance in any of the other two zones. In general, an outage in the composite system will
last longer and have higher financial costs compared to an outage in the distribution zone
[Edimu, 2009].This research project will concentrate on the reliability of the distribution
subsystem because the majority of interruptions, about 80% [Billinton & Allan, 1988], occur in
this zone. Therefore if the power interruptions in the generation and transmission are included
in the analysis, the reliability cost/worth indices will not change considerably [Billinton & Allan,
1988].
1.4 POWER GENERATION INADEQUACIES AND DISTRIBUTED GENERATION
ESKOM, the national power utility in South Africa, dominates the electricity industry, supplying
about 95% of the country’s electricity demand. The remaining 5% is supplied by municipalities,
redistributors and private generators [DBSA, 2012]. A vast majority (more than 80 %)of South
African electricity is generated from coal, which is highly emissions intensive and raises
environmental concerns [ESKOM, 2011; DBSA, 2012].
ESKOM also owns and operates the transmission grid which consisted of about 300 000 km of
power lines and 30 005MVA of installed transformer capacity by 2011. With regard to the
distribution sector, ESKOM retails about 60% of its electricity sales to licensed municipalities in
the country and 40% to a small number of private distributors. The distribution industry has an
asset base of 261 billion ZAR, and as previously mentioned, these assets need urgent financial
investment, refurbishment and rehabilitation [EDI Holdings, 2008; DBSA, 2012].
Since 2007, South Africa has faced electricity supply problems due to inadequate generation
capacity, which culminated in rolling black outs and load shedding in 2007 and 2008 [Eberhard,
2008]. According to Eberhard [2008], the main causes of the blackouts were: insufficient
generation capacity to meet growing demand, unreliable transmission and distribution
networks, as well as inadequate operation of existing plants. Between 1994 and 2007 the
reserve margin decreased from 31% to 6% [Eberhard, 2008] and currently sits at about 1%
[Strydom, 2013].
The network planning and design criteria adopted by distribution utilities in South Africa, were
meant to maximize the number of consumers connected with the funds available. Lengthy radial
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distribution networks were therefore built, supplying numerous consumers (in some cases,
more than 10000 consumers on a single-medium voltage feeder) with little or no alternative
supply options [Carter-Brown et al., 2008]. Distributed generation offers the opportunity to
integrate electricity generated from renewable resources into the system, and offers the chance
to increase the reliability of supply.
Traditionally, generation capacity has not been present in the distribution zone, and in fact, the
design of power systems did not take into consideration generation facilities at this level.
However, this has changed over the last decade, and due to technological developments in
distributed generation technology; constraints on the construction of new transmission lines
and grid infrastructure; increased customer demand for highly reliable electricity; and
environmental concerns; the presence of generation in the third hierarchical level has increased
[IEA, 2002].
Based on what has been mentioned above, this research study will also incorporate distributed
generation as a means of mitigating power supply problems, and consider its impacts on the
distribution system reliability.
1.5 MOTIVATION FOR RESEARCH AND HYPOTHESIS
The South African power industry has been facing many challenges over the past few years.
These include meeting the demand for power, as well as attaining great performance with a
power grid filled with aged equipment.  As mentioned previously, it has been estimated that
about 250 million ZAR will be needed to be invested into the power grid for refurbishment
[SANEDI, 2012a]. Proponents for smart grid technologies, like the South African National Energy
Development Institute (SANEDI), believe that these types of technologies could be the answer to
South Africa’s power industry problems.
Therefore, whilst taking into consideration the main purpose of a power system, which is to
deliver power at the lowest possible cost and at an adequate level of reliability, this research
project aims to determine the impact that smart grid techniques could potentially have on
distribution reliability, in order to determine whether they could be a potential solution to the
industry’s key challenges. It also aims to conduct a cost/benefit analysis on this impact by
attaching a value to the reliability change.
Based on what has been discussed, this research project tests the following hypothesis:
Smart grid technologies and distributed generation could beneficially improve the reliability of
a distribution feeder in South Africa.
1.5.1 Research questions
The questions which will be used to test the validity the hypothesis are:
(a) Which reliability evaluation techniques are available and which is most suitable
for the analysis?
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(b) How is distribution reliability quantified?
(c) Which factors affect reliability assessment and which are most applicable in the
South African context?
(d) Which is the most suitable test system to analyze?
(e) Which smart grid technologies affect distribution reliability at a feeder level?
(f) How do these identified smart grid techniques improve the reliability of a
distribution network?
(g) What is the reliability worth of smart grid technologies?
(h) What is the reliability worth of distributed generation?
(i) Is there any difference between the results with smart grid technique and
distributed generations or not?
(j) What will be used to determine the benefit of smart grid technologies and
distributed generation?
1.6 SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS
This research project will focus on the distribution system reliability analysis. In particular it will
focus on power system adequacy, which means power system dynamics, transient disturbances
are not considered.
1.7 REPORT FORMAT
This dissertation comprises of seven main chapters:
 Chapter 1 introduces the dissertation and motivates why the study needs to be
conducted. The hypothesis to be tested and main research questions to be answered
are also given in this chapter.
 Chapter 2 gives details on the different reliability assessment techniques. It describes
reliability and reliability worth indices. Details on smart grid techniques and distributed
generation and their impact on reliability are also discussed in this chapter.
 Chapter 3 discusses the theory applied in the development of the experiment used to
test the hypothesis.
 Chapter 4 describes the experiment design, test system and the assumptions made in
the analysis. Details on the simulation technique are also covered.
 Chapter 5 discusses the simulation procedure and the different cases and contingencies
implemented on the test system. Details on the evaluation of the financial feasibility of
the different cases are given.
 Chapter 6 presents the results of the different cases in the form of beta distributions
and average values. These results are then discussed and compared.
 Chapter 7 concludes and summaries the research findings of the dissertation. The validity
of the proposed hypothesis is examined.
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2 LITERATURE REVIEW
This chapter aims to answer the research questions posed in the previous chapter. It discusses
methods for reliability and reliability worth assessment. It also examines the relevant reliability
indices, smart grid techniques, distributed generation and how each of them affects distribution
system reliability.
2.1 POWER SYSTEM RELIABILITY
Reliability may be defined as the probability of a system performing its required tasks,
adequately for a period of time and under set operating conditions [Billinton & Allan, 1992].
This definition in itself highlights the uncertainty surrounding the ability of the power system to
perform as desired, and therefore, the purpose of power system reliability evaluation and
assessment, is to try and quantify the reliability of a system for planning and decision making. It
has been acknowledged since the 1930s [Billinton & Allan, 1994], that the behaviour of a power
system is stochastic in nature and therefore it is vital that any reliability evaluation techniques
reflect this.
It was mentioned in section 1.2, that reliability evaluation techniques can be categorized into
two groups: deterministic and probabilistic. Deterministic approaches simply use past
experiences to predict the future operation of the system. They are generally simple to
implement and easy to understand but generally result in over-designed and uneconomic
solutions [Pereira & Balu, 1992; Reppen & Feltes, 2001]. Probabilistic techniques on the other
hand incorporate the stochastic and random nature of the power system and are able to take
into account inherent unplanned events [Reppen & Feltes, 2001].
2.1.1 Probabilistic reliability assessment techniques
According to Cross et al. [2006], the study of system reliability is best achieved when using
statistics and probability distribution functions (pdfs) to describe both the inputs and
outputs of the system, as the uncertainty of these parameters are taken into consideration.
Probabilistic assessment methods use probability distribution functions to account for the
random behaviour of the power system. These may be further divided into two categories:
analytical and simulation methods.
i. Analytical techniques
These techniques are relatively simple and easy to understand and execute. The
power system is modelled mathematically and the expected value of the reliability
indices is determined using numerical analysis. Many assumptions are made to
simplify the modelling of the power system and as a result some significance in the
analysis is lost, most especially when the system is large and complex [Billinton &
Allan, 1994; Billinton & Wang, 1999a].
ii. Simulation techniques
This group of techniques treats the problem as a series of real experiments. The
main simulation method is Monte Carlo Simulations (MCS).
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Monte Carlo Simulations solve difficult reliability problems using random variables.
They involve repeatedly finding deterministic solutions to a given problem, with
each solution corresponding to a set of deterministic values of underlying random
variables. Random numbers are generated from probability distribution functions
used to describe reliability variables which behave randomly. When executing MCS,
the number of simulations is important and in many cases, thousands of simulations
need to be repeated in problem solving. Due to the availability of high speed
computing facilities in the last decade, MCS techniques have become a more viable
method for reliability assessment. MCS are very useful and yield more information
on load point reliability indices [Anders, 1990; Alkuhayli et al., 9-11 Sept. 2012;
Godha et al., 2012]
There are two types of MCS namely time sequential and non-sequential simulations.
Time sequential simulations comprise of the generation of realistic artificial
operational histories for the relevant elements of the system in chronological order
[Billinton & Wang, 1999b; Godha et al., 2012]. With regard to non sequential
methods, the state of each element in the system is obtained by sampling the
components states space and ignores the chronological order of events [Véliz et al.,
2010].
Time sequential MCS is also very flexible and has high reality potential. However it
has extreme computational demands [van Casteren et al., 2000].
2.1.2 Probability distribution functions used in reliability assessment
Probabilistic reliability evaluation techniques mimic the random behaviour of the power
system using pdfs. Literature describes the use of many different pdfs in reliability modelling
and analysis. These include the Weibull, binomial, gamma, exponential, beta and normal
pdfs.
The exponential distribution is probably the most used distribution in reliability assessment
[Nadarajah & Kotz, 2006].The negative exponential distribution has been used to represent
times to failure (TTF) when the failure rates of these components were assumed to be
constant. This is because of its mathematical elegance [van Casteren et al., 2000]. Edimu et
al. [2011] dispute this assumption and give examples of scenarios where the failure rate is
not constant (e.g. at peak load and during extreme weather conditions).
The Weibull distribution has been used in many work of reliability assessment. Although it
has been used to represent the restoration and maintenance durations [van Casteren et al.,
2000], one of its limitations is that is has an infinite range [Cross et al., 2006]. Cross et al.
[2006] also argue that despite its extensive application reliability assessment works, both
the gamma and Weibull distributions are not suitable for reliability assessment modelling as
they are only applicable to specific data sets. Cross et al. [2006]proceed to propose the use
of the beta pdf to describe reliability system inputs and outputs.
Edimu et al. [2011]also advocate for the use of the beta pdf in the description of reliability
input parameters and output indices. These authors deem it superior because unlike the
other pdfs, the beta pdf has a finite range, and has the ability to attain a variety of shapes,
allowing it to be used to describe a variety of data sets. Many other authors are in support
of this argument and have used the beta pdf extensively in their works. It has been used in
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the determination of reliability worth [Dzobo, 2010], and also in the assessment of
composite system reliability indices [Edimu, 2009]. Edimu et al. [2011] use the beta pdf for
reliability evaluation and apply it in an investigation to determine the effect of normal,
adverse and severe weather on the reliability of a power network. Herman& Gaunt [2008]
use this same distribution, to describe customer interruption costs.
2.2 POWER SYSTEM PERFOMANCE INDICES
Reliability indices are used extensively in the power system industry as a means to quantify and
assess reliability. Reliability indices measure the frequency, duration and severity of
disturbances on the network and give insight into the performance of the system. These indices
can be regarded as predictive indices or past performance indices. This depends on whether
they are to provide information relating to future system performance or relate to actual system
reliability and therefore show the actual performance of the system [Endrenyi, 1978; Fong &
Grigg, 1994; Reppen & Feltes, 2001; Edimu, 2009].There are different groups of indices and
these provide information about different aspects of the system. The indices which are listed
below pertain to the distribution system.
i. Distribution Reliability Indices of a series system [Billinton & Allan, 1994]
 Average failure rate of system ( λs)
λs=∑ λ (2.1)
where λi is the average failure rate of load point i.
N is the number of series components in the system.
 Average annual outage time of system (US)
US=∑ λ (2.2)
where ri is the average annual outage duration of load point i.
 Average outage time of system: (rs)
rs=Us/ λs (2.3)
These three indices are fundamentally important but do not give a complete picture of the
power system’s behaviour and response. It is for this reason that additional indices are
evaluated. These indices give a good reflection on the severity of system interruptions and
outages [Billinton & Allan, 1994] and are used to assess the performance reliability of the
distribution system. They can be split into two categories; namely load and energy orientated
indices and customer orientated indices. These are further explained below.
ii. Load and energy orientated point indices [Billinton & Allan, 1994]
 Energy Not Supplied(ENS) index
ENS =∑ La (i)Ui (2.4)
Page | 11
where La(i)is the average load of load point i.
Ui is the total number of customer served in the
Load point i.
 Average Energy Not supplied (AENS) index
AENS= =
∑ ( ) ( )
∑ ( )
(2.5)
where N(i) is the number of customers of load point i.
 Average customer curtailment index
ACCI= (2.6)
iii. Customer orientated indices [Billinton & Allan, 1994]
 System Average Interruption Frequency Index (SAIFI)
SAIFI= =
∑ ( ) ( )
(2.7)
where N(i) is the number of customers of load point i.
NT is the total number of customer served in
the system
 Customer Average Interruption Frequency Index(CAIFI)
CAIFI= (2.8)
 System Average Interruption Duration Index(SAIDI)
SAIDI= =
∑ ( ) ( )
(2.9)
where U(i) is the average annual outage time.
 Customer Average Interruption Duration Index(CAIDI)
CAIDI= =
∑ ( ) ( )
(2.10)
 Average Service Availability Index(ASAI)
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ASAI= =
∑ ( ) ∑ ( ) ( )
∑ ( )
(2.11)
where 8760 is the number of hours in year.
 Average Service Unavailability Index(ASUI)
ASUI= (2.12)
=1 – ASAI
The indices mentioned above are the expected values of underlying probability distribution
functions. According to Billinton & Kumar [1990], it is difficult and misleading to draw
conclusions using overall system and bus average indices. It is therefore recommended to not
only use the expected value of the index, but also the underlying probability distribution in
order to get a better understanding [Billinton et al., 1991]. Edimu [2009] is in agreement with
this statement and discusses the usefulness of probability distributions to describe the inputs
and outputs of reliability analysis.
The most commonly used indices are the SAIFI, CAIDI, SAIDI and ASAI indices. Other indices
which are not very popular but are still used, can be found in Table 2-1.These indices are the
Customer Total Average Interruption Duration Index (CTAIDI), the Average System Interruption
Frequency Index (ASIFI) and the Average System interruption Duration Index (ASIDI). A more
recent index, also included in Table 2-1, called the Momentary Average Interruption Frequency
Index (MAIFI) was proposed by Brown [2006]. The purpose of this index was to give an
indication on the costs involved due to momentary interruptions, when the duration of the
interruption is very short.
Table 2-1 Uncommon reliability indices [Brown, 2006]
Index Formula Unit
CTAIDI ∑customer interruption duration
customers experiencing one or more interruption
hours per
year
ASIFI connected kVA interrupted
total connected kVA served
per year
ASIDI connected kVA hours interupted
total connected kVA served
hours per
year
MAIFI total number of customer momentary interuptions
total number of customers served
per year
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2.3 FACTORS AFFECTING RELIABILITY
Power reliability indices are used widely by utilities for decision making and planning. These
indices are random and are affected by different factors such as weather conditions, power
system component failure due to wear and tear et cetera. The impact of these factors or events
could lead to various ramifications whose severity ranges from mere inconvenience to drastic
loss of property, equipment and even human life. Therefore, in order to get a more realistic
indication of reliability indices, it is important to identify major factors affecting power system
reliability specific to a place or area, and integrating the impact of these factors into the
reliability evaluation [Edimu, 2009]. The main factors which have been recognized for having the
most impact on the reliability indices are [Short, 2004]:
i. Weather
Severe weather greatly affects the failure and restoration duration of the components in the
distribution network and contributes to the variance of distribution indices [Alvehag &
Söder, 2011]. For example, heavy ice deposits on overhead lines during the cold season
could result in faults [Rabinowitz, 2000]. A study conducted by Edimu et al. [2011], reports
that even with the different seasons, certain severe weather elements are likely to occur at
certain times of the day. For example, lightning is more prominent in summer afternoons in
South Africa [Edimu et al., 2011].
ii. Age
The age of components in a power system has a great impact on its reliability. An aging
component of the power system is defined as a component with an average service age
greater than its design lifetime [Willis et al., 2001]. When a number of key components of
the power system are aged, aging failures become a prevailing factor of system unreliability
[Li, 2002]. Willis et al. [2001] and Bollen [2001] argue that a component in the power system
is more likely to fail due to aging and that the failure rate of a component increases as it
continues to age. Li et al. [2007] emphasises the importance of age in power system
reliability and stresses that aging failures cannot be excluded in reliability evaluation.
According to the a report released by the Development Bank of South Africa (DBSA) in 2012,
ageing infrastructure is the key challenge facing the electricity generation, transmission and
distribution sectors of the country [DBSA, 2012].
iii. Physical environment
The physical environment and in particular, the tree coverage and vegetation surrounding
the distribution grid have an impact on the system reliability [Short, 2004]. Vegetation
maintenance involves the removal of trees and vegetation which could potentially cause
faults and interruption if they were to come in contact with overhead lines.
iv. Percent underground
There are two ways of delivering power: through overhead lines and underground cables.
The overhead lines cost less to install and maintain and as a result have been the dominant
means of power delivery. But the use of underground cables has been increasing because
they are more reliable than overhead lines. Underground cables are less likely to fail and are
more reliable than overhead lines [Short, 2004]. They are less suscepticle to disturbances
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from weather elements and the physical environment, but on the otherhand, they are more
complex to install and maintain [Rabinowitz, 2000; Sahin & Aras, 2007; Hall, 2009].
v. Distribution Voltage
The reliability of a power system decreases as the voltage level increases. The greatest
advantage associated with higher disitribution voltages is that more power can be delivered
for a given current.This means less line losses. Higher voltage systems also require fewer
capacitors and regulators. Utilities can also decrease the size of the conductor or distribute
more power for the same conductor size. A higher distribution voltage also allows utilities to
run much longer distribution circuits with few distrbution substations. But as already
mentioned a higher disitribution voltage results in reduced distribution reliability due to
longer circuits and more exposure to lightning and wind. Higher distribution lines have more
voltage sags and interruptions. There is also an increased safety risk for maintenance
personel and the cost of equipment (transformers, cable insulators,etc) is higher [Burke,
2001; Short, 2004].
vi. Load density
The load on the power system is never constant and is continuously varying. The load
directly impacts the reliability of the system because if the system is overloaded and the
components stressed, the chances of an interruption increase [Burke, 2001].
Although all the six factors listed above are important and have been highlighted in literature as
having a great impact on power system reliability, this research project will concentrate on the
impact of aged equipment reliability. There are three main reasons for this: the first is that this
research project focuses on the potential benefits smart grid techniques could offer the country
in terms of reliability improvement. Secondly, aged and under maintained equipment
components have been identified as the key and main challenge facing the power industry in
South Africa [NERSA, 2007; EDI Holdings, 2008; DBSA, 2012]. It is therefore imperative to include
the impact of aging in the analysis. Lastly, literature has indicated that in a system where aged
equipment is prevalent, the effect of aging must be incorporated in the reliability evaluation
[Willis et al., 2001; Bollen, 2001; Li et al., 2007]. The next sub section will highlight the impact
that aged equipment has in power system reliability analysis.
2.3.1 Aged equipment
It has been well documented in literature that the relationship between failure rate or
failure probability and age, can be represented using the basin or bath tub curve as
illustrated in Figure 2-1 [Wang et al., 2002; Li et al., 2006].
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Figure 2-1 Bath tub curve for failure rate of equipment [Li et al., 2006]
During the infant stage, the failure rate decreases and eventually stabilizes. Most of the
failures during this stage are due to manufacturing, design, misuse, packaging,
transportation, storage, and installation faults. It reflects the failure rate due to weak parts
that escape final testing and screening [Oroge, 1991]. Rigorous testing, environmental stress
screening and high quality control can be used to minimize the number of weak components
leaving factories [Cheng, 2006]. During the normal operating stage, the failure rate of
equipment is generally constant and most failures are random [Oroge, 1991]. Most
reliability assessments assume that equipment is operating in this stage. During the wear-
out stage, the equipment has reached or is approaching end of life and the failure rate
increases dramatically with age. Although the useful period of a power system component
may be extended through regular maintenance, in practice the component will fail as a
result of wear out and aging [Billinton & Allan, 1992; Li et al., 2006].
2.4 BENCH MARK TEST SYSTEMS
Two published bench mark test systems have been identified for reliability assessment namely,
the IEEE Reliability Test System (RTS) and the Roy Billiton Test System (RBTS). The IEEE RTS is a
24 bus system, with 10 generator buses, 17 load buses, 33 transmission lines, 5 transformers
and 32 generating units. This test system is applicable for bulk power and composite system
reliability evaluation methods [Reliability Test System Task Force, 1999]. Billinton et al. [1989]
describes the IEEE RTS as a large power network which can be difficult to use for initial studies in
an educational environment. It requires the use of computer programs to perform the vast
majority of reliability analyses. According to Billinton et al. [1989], “a technique, however
elegant it may be, should first be applied to a small system which can be easily solved and
appreciated by the student using hand calculations before being extended to computer
development.”It is for these reasons that Billinton et al. [1989] developed the RBTS, which is
simple enough to allow reasonable evaluation times but could still ensure that the studies have
enough detail to reflect the actual complexities involved in practical reliability analysis. At first
publication, the RBTS did not include the description of necessary distribution and sub
transmission networks, but this was later changed in 1991 [Allan et al., 1991] and these
networks were further developed in 1996 [Billinton & Jonnavithula, 1996].
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The next section will discuss smart grid techniques and will particularly emphasis those which
impact distribution reliability.
2.5 SMART GRID TECHNOLOGIES
Smart grid technologies refer to a group of improved technologies and concepts, that use digital
and other advanced technologies, to monitor and manage the transmission of electricity from all
generation sources, to meet the varying electricity demands of end users [IEA, 2011].In a broad
sense, a “smart grid” refers to a conventional electric power system equipped with these
technologies for the purpose of reliability improvement, ease of control and management,
integrating of distributed energy resources and electricity market operations. Figure 2-2depicts
the concept of what a completely smart power grid envisioned in the future entails.
Figure 2-2 Smarter Electricity Systems [IEA, 2011]
Some the characteristics of a smart grid are as follows. A smart grid [Uluski, 2010; IEA, 2011]:
 Enables informed participation by customers
 Accommodates all generation (including renewable energy supply) and
storage options
 Provides power quality for the range of needs
 Optimizes asset and utilization and operation efficiency
 Provides resilience against disturbances, attacks and natural disasters. It can
detect and isolate disturbances and minimizes its impact i.e.it is self healing.
According to Uluski [2010], the two main objectives of smart grid technologies are to:
i. Provide information that will enable the customer to make informed decisions
ii. Enable the electric utility to make decisions, to operate the power system more
effectively and efficiently in order to achieve higher reliability.
In order to fulfil the two main objectives of the power system, different types of technologies
and techniques have been developed. These may be grouped together into five key areas
[NELT, 2007a]:
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i. Integrated Communications
These are high speed, fully integrated, two-way communication technologies
which make the smart grid a dynamic and interactive infrastructure for real-
time information exchange. This group of technologies allow network grid
components to ‘talk’, ‘listen’ and ‘interact’.
ii. Sensing and Measurement
These technologies improve power system measurements and enable the
transformation of data into information. They assess the condition of grid
equipment and evaluate the integrity of the grid. They also support advanced
protective relaying.
iii. Advanced components
Advanced components are the latest research in materials, superconductivity,
energy storage, power electronics and microelectronics. Together, these
components will lead to higher power densities, greater reliability and improved
energy efficiency.
iv. Improved Interfaces and Decision Support
The time available for operators to make decisions in many instances is very
short. Decision support with improved interfaces will amplify human decision
making at all levels of the grid.
v. Advanced Control Methods
These are devices and algorithms that will analyse, diagnose and predict
conditions in the smart grid. They determine and take appropriate corrective
actions to eliminate, mitigate and prevent outages and power quality
disturbances. To a large extent, these technologies are dependent on the other
four key technology areas. For example, these technologies will monitor
essential components (sensing and measurement), provide timely and
appropriate response (integrated communications) and enable rapid
diagnosis(improved interfaces and decision support) of any event [Kazemi,
2011].
Smart grid technologies are used to fulfil a specific set of applications or functions in the
electric power system. There are a number of smart grid technologies available which can
be classified in the above mentioned areas. The scope of this study will only include smart
grid technologies which can be used to improve the reliability of a distribution feeder. These
technologies have been identified and will be discussed next.
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2.5.1 Smart grid technologies for distribution feeder reliability enhancement
One of the most appealing advantages of smart grid technologies is the reduced reaction
and restoration time. This is most apparent when a fault has occurred. Ordinarily when a
disturbance causes a fault on the network, grid operators are unable to identify the exact
location of the faulted section of the feeder. The repair crew are dispatched, and have to
perform trial and error switching actions on circuit breakers and isolators, in an effort to find
the exact location of the fault. This can take a considerable amount of time during the day
and more especially at night or during unfavourable weather conditions, resulting in
increased outage duration.
There are a number of smart grid technologies which have been developed in order to
reduce the fault location time. These are discussed below:
i. Distance to fault estimator
Fault locators reduce the impact of faults as they speed up the restoration process,
by allowing isolating and switching operations to be performed much faster
[Morales-España et al., 2009].
Distance to fault estimators, are an optional module of modern distribution
protection equipment which can be used for estimating the fault location. When a
fault occurs, this module calculates the fault location as a distance from the
substation to the fault. It can also notify this information to the control centre or the
utility repairs crew using a suitable communication medium. By using distance to
fault estimators, a much smaller zone of the distribution network is inspected for
faults. However, when a feeder has multiple taps, there might be several probable
fault locations for the fault distance indicated by this module. In order to overcome
this problem, fault passage indicators should be used in conjunction with distance to
fault estimators [Kazemi, 2011].
ii. Fault passage indicators
Fault passage indictors are devices which are located at strategic points along the
feeder, and are designed to indicate whether fault current has passed that
particular point. They are usually installed at points where switching decision can be
made. Fault passage indicators are able to distinguish between fault current and
load current. Several fault passage indicators installed along a feeder will enable
quick identification of the passage of fault current. The status of these devices can
be recognized remotely or by visiting its physical location. In the past, fault passage
indicators could only be used in radial distribution networks, but there are new
generation fault passage indicators which can be used in other electricity
distribution networks [Newman, 1990; Kazemi, 2011; Nortech, 2013]. Figure 2-3
depicts the configuration of an automatic fault location system using a fault passage
indicator. Further details on this type of technology are provided in Appendix A.
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One of the primary features of the smart grid is its ability to automate a number of feeder
functions such that the grid becomes more efficient and robust.
iii. Feeder Automation
Feeder automation is an automatic control scheme that is used for automatic fault
detection and isolation, and service in an electricity distribution network. Utilizing
modern computer technology, micro-electronics and communication technology,
modern feeder automation technologies conduct operations and risk assessments,
in order to make decisions regarding the operation of the distribution feeders and
the distribution grid as a whole [Huang et al., 2012].
An automated grid is self-healing and recovers quickly from faults. When a
permanent fault occurs, the customers affected by the fault may be categorised into
two groups. The first group of customers are those who will have to wait until the
faulted feeder section has been repaired. The second group includes those
customers whose power supply has been interrupted, but can be restored through
the main or alternate supplies by means of switching and isolating healthy and
faulted feeder sections. In most cases the second group is larger than the first group
[Uluski, 2010; Kazemi, 2011].
In the case of manually operated distribution systems and feeders, the fault
isolation and service restoration activities can only be done after the fault has been
located. However, feeder automation can reduce outage duration and restore
supply to as many customers as possible by performing fault location, isolation and
service restoration (FLISR) automatically. FLISR is able to restore service to
customers in one minute or less, resulting in significant reliability improvement
compared to traditional manual switching [Uluski, 2010; Kazemi, 2011].
Uluski [2010] illustrates the FLISR procedure and this is shown in Figure 2-4 to
Figure 2-7.
Figure 2-3Configuration of self-developed automatic fault
location system[Cheng et al., 2009]
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a. Fault detection:- the system detects that a feeder fault has occurred.
Figure 2-4 Fault detection [Uluski, 2010]
b. Fault location:-the faulted feeder section is identified and located between
two remote controlled line switches.
Figure 2-5 Fault located [Uluski, 2010]
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c. Fault isolation:-the faulted feeder section is isolated using the appropriate
line switches.
d. Service restoration:-the undamaged sections of the feeder are re-energized
via the primary feeder source or back up sources using remote controlled tie
switches.
Figure 2-7 Service restoration [Uluski, 2010]
There are many advocates for smart grid techniques in literature [NELT, 2007a; Uluski, 2010;
Enerweb, 2011; Kazemi, 2011; Hidalgo et al., 2011; Huang et al., 2012]. Kazemi [2011] evaluates
the reliability benefit of a number of smart grid technologies under the assumption that all
system components are operating in the normal stage, where the failure rate is at its lowest and
is for the most part constant. Hidalgo et al. [2011] evaluates system performance with smart
grid technologies and distributed generation integrated into the system. Despite these
advocates, none have evaluated and quantified the benefit of smart grid within a grid with aging
infrastructure, which is a prevalent challenge in many countries like South Africa. However, IEA
[2011] mentions that smart grid technologies provide an opportunity to maximise the use of
Figure 2-6 Fault isolated [Uluski, 2010]
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existing infrastructure through better monitoring and management whilst new infrastructure is
strategically deployed.
2.6 DISTRIBUTED GENERATION
Many different definitions have been put forward for distributed generation, which is also
commonly known as embedded generation or dispersed generation [Pepermans et al., 2005;
Keane, 2007]. Distributed generation (DG) may be defined as power generation or production
units located on-site serving a customer, or providing support to a distribution network
connected to the grid at distribution voltage levels [IEA, 2002; Zhang et al., 2011]. Others have
defined DG as only small-scale, environmentally friendly technologies such as photovoltaic (PV)
and small wind turbines, that are installed on and designed primarily to serve a single end user’s
site. It could include all generation installed near a customer’s load, regardless of size and
energy source. Other definitions limit the size of DG between 10kW to 50MW of capacity [Daly
& Morrison, 2001]. This research project will adopt a definition by Barker & de Mello [2000],
who define DG as power generation which is about 10MW or less and is interconnected at the
substation, distribution feeder or customer load levels.
DG can take the form of renewable generation, fuel cells or small and micro sized turbines
packages, stirling-engine based generators, and internal combustion engine generators [Barker
& de Mello, 2000]. The main drivers for distributed generation globally include: electricity
market liberalisation, developments in DG technology, constraints on the construction of new
transmission lines and grid infrastructure, increased customer demand for highly reliable
electricity, and environmental concerns [IEA, 2002].
2.6.1 Benefits of Distributed Generation (DG)
Many benefits of DG have been listed in literature. These benefits include economic savings,
reduced transmission and distribution costs (T&D) of about 30 % [IEA, 2002], voltage
support, improved power quality, energy loss reduction, improved environmental
performance and improved system reliability. Proponents of DG say that these economic
savings from T&D costs are large, but many utilities have disputed this and stated that these
savings are negligible [Daly & Morrison, 2001].
The arguments presented by advocates for DG may be used to identify the potential
benefits of DG on a global level, but achieving these benefits is much more difficult than is
often realized. According to Barker & de Mello [2000] and Daly & Morrison [2001],decision
makers and system planners must address local conditions on a case by case basis in order
to determine whether DG can in fact improve reliability and provide all the other above
mentioned benefits in that specific instance. This requires a detailed analysis.
2.6.2 Problems associated with the integration of DG
The design of distribution networks does not usually consider the presence of distribution
generation units and as a result, a number of uncertainties may be introduced into the
system. Despite the previously mentioned potential benefits, DG may bring about many
problems when it is added to an already existing network and could even worsen the
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performance of the network [Khan, 2008; Zhang et al., 2011]. For example, the reliability of
the power system may be degraded if the distributed resource is not properly co-ordinated
with the electric power system protection [Khan, 2008]. On the other hand, a well designed
and implemented system could handle the addition of generation if there is proper
grounding, transformers, and protection provided [Barker & de Mello, 2000; Khan, 2008].
There are also limits to the amount of additional generation that can be added to a
particular system. Beyond this point, it would be necessary to modify and change the
existing distribution system and to add more equipment in the form of protection relays,
switch gears, change the voltage regulation system and revised grounding [Khan, 2008].
Other problems associated with DG include: increased harmonics, voltage flicker and power
flow reversal.
This study will focus on analysing the impact distributed generation could have on
distribution reliability.
2.6.3 Distributed generation in the context of reliability
If DG units are well co-ordinated, they may have a positive impact on distribution reliability.
Implementation of distributed generation can increase reliability if DG units are configured
to provide backup-islands during upstream utility source outages. Islanding occurs when a
DG unit or units, continue to energize a portion of the utility system that has been separated
from the main utility system [Barker & de Mello, 2000; Brown & Freeman, 2001].
Islanding is an important operation mode. Coupled with reliable DG units and careful co-
ordination of utility sectionalising and protection equipment, islanding can result in
improved reliability [Barker & de Mello, 2000; Atwa & El-Saadany, 2009]. This mode of
operation needs to be well planned in order to prevent the occurrence of other problems
within the system. Figure 2-8 illustrates intentional islanding. In this diagram, a fault is
depicted to have occurred along the distribution feeder. In order to re-energise the
customers downstream of the fault, the DG unit(s) should be able to supply the load in the
islanded section whilst maintaining suitable voltage and frequency levels. An isolating device
is necessary in order to separate the different sections of the feeder. In this setup, the
distributed generation could result in a momentary interruption for the customers in the
area supported by the generator, depending on the duration it takes to detect, locate and
isolate the fault as well as the DG unit’s start up duration. Power flow analysis of island
scenarios is necessary to ensure that proper voltage regulation is established and
maintained within the island. When the faulted section has been repaired, the isolating
switch should not be closed unless the utility and ‘island’ are in tight synchronisation
[Barker & de Mello, 2000; Wang et al., 2008].
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2.6.4 Distributed generation, enabling smart grid technologies
Overall, using islanding to improve power system reliability is a complicated task, but new
automated switch technologies and communication approaches make this scheme more
practical [Barker & de Mello, 2000]. According to Hidalgo et al. [2011], smart grid
technologies and distributed generation mutually enable one another; and they technically
and economically support each other. There are a number of smart grid technologies on the
market, which, unlike the traditional grid, enable the easy integration of DG into the existing
power system, to achieve flexible and efficient application of DG technology [Huang et al.,
2012; Barker & de Mello, 2000].
Using advanced sensing technology like fault detectors, communication technology,
advanced distribution automation, feeder automation and control technology like FLISR,
smart grid technologies effectively take advantage of DG technology in order to achieve
flexible DG integration, maintaining and even improving system reliability [Huang et al.,
2012].
Advanced sensors and metering, monitor the operation of feeder equipment and DG
technology on the distribution grid. This information is then transmitted using
communications technology [Huang et al., 2012].
Utilizing modern computing technology, micro- electronics and communication technology,
advanced distribution and feeder automation technology use this information to make
decisions regarding the dispatching of DG. For example, by implementing FLISR, DG can also
be dispatched in order to restore power supply to customers who do not have to wait for
the faulted feeder section to be repaired [Uluski, 2010; Huang et al., 2012].
2.7 POWER SYSTEM RELIABILITY WORTH
It was previously mentioned in section 1.2, that the fundamental purpose of a power system is
to deliver the electrical energy requirements of consumers at the lowest possible cost and at an
Figure 2-8 Intentional Islanding of distribution feeder [Barker & de Mello, 2000]
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adequate level of reliability. The expectations of customers regarding quality of service are
continuously increasing as the dependence on electricity increases. In addition to this,
customers also expect to receive electricity at the lowest possible cost [Ghajar et al., 1996].
These two factors, reliability and cost as depicted in Figure 2-9 are in constant conflict, and in
order to balance the economic and cost considerations, utilities incorporate both reliability and
cost considerations in decision making processes [Ghajar et al., 1996; Billinton & Zhang, 2001].
Figure 2-9 illustrates the concept of reliability cost/benefit analysis. The investment cost
represents the costs incurred by the utility which consists of capital, maintenance and operation
costs. In general, as the investment cost increases the system reliability also increases. The
damage cost represents the customer interruption costs, which are the economic losses of the
customer due to the absence of electricity. Reliability worth refers to the value or benefit of
power supply reliability. The damage cost acts as a surrogate for the worth of reliability and is
not equal to it. They are instead the costs incurred by customers or the utility due to
unreliability. The total cost curve is a sum of both the investment cost and the damage cost.
Optimum reliability is achieved when the total cost curve attains a minimum [Ghajar et al., 1996;
Billinton & Zhang, 2001].
2.7.1 Reliability worth assessment
Cost/benefit analyses of power systems have become very important in the determination
of system reinforcement and expansion [Billinton & Zhang, 2001]. Assessing the worth of
reliability is a difficult and subjective task and has even been deemed impossible by some
authors [Tollefson et al., 1994; Billinton & Wang, 1999a].
Nonetheless, the evaluation of customer interruption costs is considered an adequate
surrogate for reliability worth [Ghajar et al., 1996; Vásquez & Vaca, 2012]. Evaluating the
damage cost and reliability worth indices requires three distinct models: a reliability model,
cost model and load model [Alvehag, 2008].
Figure 2-9Investment, damage and total cost as a function of system
reliability [Billinton & Zhang, 2001]
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Figure 2-10 Reliability Worth Assessment components
The following indices are usually used to evaluate the reliability cost/worth of a system [Billinton
& Wang, 1998]:
 Expected Energy Not Supplied (EENS)index
EENS= Σ Liri,jλi,j (2.13)
where Li is the average load at load point i
ri,j is the outage duration of load point i due to the failure of load point j
λi,j is the failure rate of load point i due to the failure of load point j
 Expected Customer Interruption Cost (ECOST) index
ECOST at a load point, which is equivalent to the Customer Interruption Cost
(CIC) is given below.
ECOST=cij Li λij (2.14)
where cij is the per unit interruption cost of load point i due to the failure
of load point j
 Interrupted Energy Assessment Rate (IEAR)
IEAR= (unit/kWh) (2.15)
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2.8 SUMMARY
This chapter has answered some of the research questions posed in chapter 1. These are as
follows:
(a) Which reliability evaluation techniques are available and which is most suitable for the
analysis?
Deterministic and probabilistic approaches were identified as the two main approaches
used to evaluate distribution reliability. Deterministic approaches simply use past
experiences to predict the future operation of the system. They are generally simple to
implement and easy to understand but generally result in over-designed and uneconomic
solutions [Pereira & Balu, 1992; Reppen & Feltes, 2001]. Probabilistic techniques on the
other hand, incorporate the stochastic and random nature of the power system and are able
to take into account inherent unplanned events [Reppen & Feltes, 2001]. The most
appropriate approach and techniques is selected in the next chapter.
(b) How is distribution reliability quantified?
Reliability indices are used to quantify distribution reliability. The most appropriate
reliability indices to be quantified have not been selected as yet.
(c) Which factors affect reliability assessment and which are most applicable in the South
African context?
The main factors which have been recognized for having the most impact on reliability
indices are weather, age, physical environment, percent underground, distribution voltage
and load density. Ageing infrastructure has been identified as the key challenge facing the
distribution industry.
(d) Which is the most suitable test system to analyze?
This has not been completely answered, but the IEEE RTS and RBTS have been identified as
bench mark test systems.
(e) Which smart grid technologies affect distribution reliability at a feeder level?
The identified smart grid technologies include: fault passage indicator, distance to fault
estimators and feeder automation.
(f) How do these indentified smart grid techniques improve the reliability of a distribution
network?
Not yet answered.
(g) What is the reliability worth benefit of smart grid technologies?
Not yet answered.
(h) What is the reliability worth benefit of distributed generation?
Not yet answered.
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(i) Is there any difference between the results with smart grid technique and distributed
generations and not?
Not yet answered.
(j) What will be used to determine the benefit of smart grid technologies and distributed
generation?
Not yet answered.
Research questions (f) to (j) were not completely answered in literature. The next chapter
discusses the development of the theory used in order to find answers to these research
questions.
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3 THEORY DEVELOPMENT
This chapter discusses the development of the theory used in the designing of the experiment used to
test the hypothesis. The key reasons behind the selection of the applied assessment technique and
models are presented.
3.1 RELIABILITY EVALUATION
In order to evaluate the reliability benefit of the selected smart grid techniques and distributed
generation; a test system, reliability assessment technique, and modelling approaches needed
to be selected. These attributes were discussed in detail in chapter 2, and where necessary, the
advantages and disadvantages were highlighted. This subsection will discuss the reasons behind
the selection of the different modules needed to develop a power system reliability evaluation
model.
3.1.1 Reliability evaluation approach and technique
There are two main approaches which can be used to evaluate system reliability:
deterministic and probabilistic. For the purposes of this study, the probabilistic approach
was selected, because unlike the deterministic approach, the probabilistic approach
incorporates the stochastic behaviour of a power system [Pereira & Balu, 1992].
As discussed in chapter two, there are also two main techniques which have been
implemented in reliability evaluation: analytical techniques and simulation techniques. The
time sequential Monte Carlo Simulation (MCS) technique was selected for a number of
reasons, namely [Anders, 1990; Billinton & Allan, 1994; Billinton & Wang, 1999a; van
Casteren et al., 2000]:
i. Analytical techniques require many assumptions to be made, resulting in the loss of
the significance in the analysis
ii. It is well established and used extensively in literature
iii. It allows for the random nature of the power system to be modelled by using
random reliability variables, and random numbers generated from probability
distribution functions.
iv. The availability of high speed computing facilities make it a more viable option
v. MCS yields more information on load point and system indices.
vi. Time sequential MCS is flexible and has a high reality potential.
3.1.2 Probabilistic Reliability assessment
The study of system reliability is best achieved when statistics and probability distribution
functions are used to describe both inputs and outputs of the system [Cross et al., 2006].
Billinton & Kumar [1990] emphasise that it is difficult and misleading to draw conclusions on
system performance using the average value of system indices. This is in agreement with
Cross et al. [2006], who recommend that output reliability indices be represented by
probability distribution functions. Edimu [2009] also supports this view and illustrates the
usefulness of probability distributions to describe input and output parameters. It is in the
light of this argument, that the input parameters and output reliability indices in this study,
will be described using a probability distribution functions.
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3.1.3 Need for the Beta Distribution
Many different probability distribution functions have been used in reliability modelling and
these are discussed in section 2.1.2. However, a strong case has been made in literature for
the use of the beta distribution to describe system inputs and outputs [Cross et al., 2006;
Edimu et al., 2011]. The main advantages associated with this distribution are its flexible
shape and finite range. As a result, the beta distribution can be used to describe a variety of
data sets. Therefore, the beta distribution will be used extensively in this study to model
reliability input parameters and output reliability indices. The beta distribution is described
below.
The Beta distribution
The beta distribution is defined as follows:
f(x, α, β) =
( )
∫ ( )
(3.1)
where alpha (α) and beta (β) are the parameters of the function.
The beta distribution is very versatile in the shapes it exhibits. A given shape is derived by
assigning the necessary values to its parameters. Figure 3-1shows some of the shapes the
beta distribution can exhibit, given the values of its shape parameters. It also has a finite
range (0 to 1), but this range increased or decreased by a scaling factor equal to the
maximum value (c) in the data set [Herman, 1993; Cross et al., 2006].
The parameters of the beta distribution may also be defined in terms of the mean (µ), the
standard deviation (σ) and c (the scaling factor) as described by equations 3.2 and 3.3. The
inverse is also applicable i.e. the mean, standard deviation may also be determined from
alpha, beta and c [Herman, 1993; Cross et al., 2006].
Figure 3-1 Examples of the beta probability density functions [Cross et al., 2006]
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α =
( )
(3.2)
β =
( )( )
=(c − µ)α (3.3)
Percentage risk and Confidence levels
Since the output reliability indices of the MCS will be described using a probability
distribution, there is a variety of different single indicative values which can be sampled
from the distribution for each index. A risk value is associated with each single indicative
value. The risk is defined as the probability of exceeding the percentile value. The risk level
translates into the uncertainly associated with the specific value. For example, a risk level of
10 % (or conversely 90 % confidence level), resulting in a certain calculated output value,
means that there is 90 % confidence the output value will not be surpassed. A value
corresponding to a specific confidence level can be calculated using the alpha and beta
parameters of that specific distribution [Kendall & Stuart, 1973].
In order to get an indication of the variation and spread of each distribution, the 10th, 50th
and 90th percentile values of each distribution describing the output reliability indices will be
given. This also allows for the comparison of different distributions at different confidence
intervals.
3.1.4 Reliability indices selection
A wide variety of indices have been used extensively in literature and by utilities to
determine customer and system reliability.
Research conducted by the South African electricity regulator, National Energy Regulator of
South Africa (NERSA), found SAIDI to be the best index for it to use in its distribution
incentive scheme, which regulates the revenue of the distribution [NERSA, 2011].Therefore,
the distribution system operators (DSOs) in South Africa have great incentive to reduce
SAIDI. Since this research project is considering a South African context, the impact of smart
grid techniques and distribution generation on SAIDI will be included.
Although SAIDI has been deemed the best index for regulatory purposes by NERSA, the
frequency of interruptions is also important. In emerging economies small to medium sized
enterprises are vulnerable to chronic interruptions. High SAIFI figures can threaten the
viability of a business by eroding commercial confidence [Herman & Gaunt, 2008].Therefore
SAIFI and MAIFI will also be included in the results section.
In this study, a momentary interruption is defined as an interruption with duration greater
than 3 seconds but no longer than 5 minutes, as defined by the NRS 048-6:2006
specification for the Electricity Supply Industry for medium voltage (MV) and low voltage
(LV) systems [Chatterton et al., 2006]. SAIDI, SAIFI and MAIFI are customer orientated
indices. In order get an indication of the overall feeder performance, the feeder failure rate
(λfeeder) and unavailability (Ufeeder)will also be given.
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3.1.5 Modelling of aged transformer behaviour
System components tend to fail as they wear out with age. This results in an increased
failure rate. The reliability modelling and evaluation in this research project, will concentrate
on distribution transformers operating in the wear-out stage, as this is the current state of
most transformers in the South African distribution grid. Distribution transformers are a key
component of distribution grids and their reliable operation directly impacts that of the
entire network [Jagers & Tenbohlen, 2009]. Transformers also represent a significant cost to
the electric utilities, both as a capital investment and as an ongoing operating expense. They
can account for up to 20 % of the total distribution capital spending per annum [Van Zandt
& Walling, 2004]. As transformers age, their internal condition deteriorates, increasing the
risk of failure. Both their mechanical and dielectric strength degrade to a point where they
cannot effectively withstand system events such as short circuit faults or transient over-
voltages [Wang et al., 2002; Bartley, 2011]. According to Bartley [2011], ageing transformers
are a huge risk to the electric power supply and could cause major losses.
Failure rate data of distribution transformers operating in their end life was used to model
the effect of aging on transformers. From Figure 2-1, it is evident that the failure rate of
components operating in the worn out region varies considerably. The uncertainty in
transformer failure rate can be accounted for using the beta distribution.
3.1.6 Distributed generation
The effect of distributed generation on reliability was also investigated in this study. The
technology selected in this study was solar PV. It was chosen for the following reasons:
 The solar resource available for the selected area (Johannesburg, South Africa) is
favourable for solar PV.
 Electricity generation from solar PV is environmentally friendly.
 It is a renewable source of energy.
 The cost of solar PV systems has declined tremendously over the past few years
and this is expected to continue into the next decade [IRENA, 2012].
 The installation of solar PV into the South African grid has been promoted through
the Renewable Energy Independent Power Procurement Programme (REIPPP) in
broad accordance with the Integrated Resource Plan (IRP) for Electricity [2010].
About 1450MW has been allocated for solar PV through this programme
[Department of Energy, 2013]
Solar PV Model
The solar PV model selected for the analysis is dependent on the time of day and season of
the year. The output of a solar PV system is highly reliant on the available direct solar
insolation available in a specific area. The direct solar insolation is dependent on the time of
day and on the season of the year as shown in Figure 3-2. The available direct solar
insolation in the afternoon differs from that available in the late evening. The available
direct solar insolation in the summer is generally much greater than that available in the
winter. Therefore a time of day and time of year dependent model will yield a more realistic
estimate of the output power of a solar PV system.
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Figure 3-2 Direct solar insolation for different months [SoDa, 2005]
3.1.7 Test system selection
As mentioned in chapter 2 above, there are two benchmark test systems that have been
published in literature .i.e. the IEEE RTS and the RBTS. But for distribution system reliability
analysis, the RBTS is the only published bench mark test system. For the purposes of this study
the RBTS was selected.  Although it is not a South African test system, its system components
are similar to those of the South African power system. The advantages regarding the RBTS
include the fact that is best suited for educational purposes; it is used extensively in research
and it is well defined. Although it is a simple system, it allows for reasonable reliability
evaluation and ensures that the studies reflect, with enough detail, the actual complexities
involved in the practical reliability analysis [Billinton et al., 1989].
The RBTS, shown in Figure 3-3, is a 6 bus system containing 5 load buses, 2 generator buses and
9 transmission lines. Bus1 and bus2 each have 4 and 7 generating units respectively, with a
0 5 10 15 20 25
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
Time of day (hours)
D
ire
ct
 s
ol
ar
 in
so
la
tio
n 
(k
W
/m
2 )
summer (January)
winter (July)
Figure 3-3 Single line diagram of RBTS [Billinton et al., 1989]
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combined total of 11 generating units.
The hypothesis of this study aims to test the reliability improvement of the selected smart grid
techniques and distributed generation on a feeder. Feeder 1 of bus 6 of the RBTS was selected
for the analysis. This feeder contains a good mix of all possible system components and a
sufficient number of load points. Due to the limited South African load and cost data available,
the customer type composition of the feeder was slightly altered to suite the available data
resources.
Similar to the RBTS data assumptions, the bulk of the customers on the feeder are still assumed
to be residential, but in this case, the residential customers belong to the medium to high
income group. In order to create a more realistic setting, a few commercial retail customers
were added to the feeder. These changes had no impact on the components and structure of
the test system.
Further details of the test system and customer type categories will be presented in chapter 4.
3.2 RELIABILITY WORTH EVALUATION
The evaluation of the reliability worth indices requires a load and cost model to be integrated in
to the model used to evaluate system reliability. This subsection will discuss the selection of the
load and cost models, and will also briefly discuss the method selected for the economic
feasibility assessment.
3.2.1 Reliability worth indices
The EENS and customer interruption costs are the reliability worth indices to be explored in
this analysis. The EENS gives an indication of the energy requirements of the customer that
were not met. The EENS can also be used by utilities to determine the loss of revenue as a
result of an interruption. The customer interruption costs give an indication of the monetary
loses of customers.
3.2.2 Load model
The evaluation of the reliability worth index, EENS requires the development of a load
model.  Accurately modelling the load of a power system continues to be difficult. A few of
the key reasons for this are [IEEE Task Force, 1993; Chan, 2003]:
i. Variation in load composition depending on the time of day and day of week,
season, weather etc.
ii. Lack of precise information on the composition of the load.
iii. Large number of diverse load components.
iv. Ownership and location of load devices in customer facilities not directly accessible
to the electric utility.
According to Coutto Filho et al. [2002], using probabilistic methods in load modelling, results
in a more consistent analysis of power system performance. Leite da Silva et al. [2002]
support this position, and explain that deterministic methods represent past experience and
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future expectation by numbers, without assigning any degree of likelihood to these
numbers. A more realistic way of incorporating past experience, is to identify factors which
contribute to a particular load, and associating factors with a probability [Do Coutto Filho et
al., 3-5 Jul 1991 ; Leite da Silva et al., 2002]. Based on this argument, a probabilistic
approach will also be adopted in modelling the system load.
Probabilistic load modelling
There is a large variety of distributions which have been used in literature to model load, the
most common is the Gaussian pdf.  The use of this distribution to model load has been
discouraged by a number of authors [Seppala, 1995; Singh et al., 2010]. Seppala [1995]
argues that the power system load distribution is generally skewed. This is contrary to the
Gaussian model which is symmetrical. Seppala [1995] goes on to recommend the use of the
lognormal distribution.
Herman & Kritzinger [1993] fitted the Weibull, normal, Erlang and beta distributions to
grouped domestic loads and found the beta distribution to be most suitable. Heius &
Herman [2002] also use the beta distribution to describe load uncertainty for a South
African residential load model and deem the model appropriate. This view supports the
finding of an extensive load monitor program conducted in South Africa. The program found
that for residential consumers in South Africa, a typical distribution of the load current of
one consumer measured over a period of time, may be approximated using the beta
probability distribution [Heunis & Herman, 2002].
The arguments given above indicate that beta distribution has been found to be suitable for
modelling load and more importantly, that this distribution is suitable in the South African
context. Therefore the beta distribution will be adopted for load modelling purposes.
The load of the power system varies with the time of the day and season of the year, and
the careful incorporation of these factors, improves the accuracy of the load model. The
unavailability of South African commercial load data, resulted in the use of a deterministic
time varying load model, which was developed based on the RBTS data sheet assumptions.
The focus of this study was not on load modelling, and therefore this had no significant
impact on the analysis. On the other hand, the availability of sufficient residential load data
allowed for the development of a probabilistic load model for residential customers, who
constitute more than 90 %of the customers on the test system feeder. The data was used to
model the load at different times of day and during different seasons of the year. This is
described in more detail in chapter 4.
3.2.3 Cost Model
The purpose of the cost model is to quantify the monetary value of losses incurred by the
customer due to an interruption. The most commonly used cost model is in the form of a
customer damage function (CDF) [Alvehag, 2008]. The CDF models the interruption costs as
a function of outage duration. The particular CDF used in this analysis was independent of
the load of the customer. This is because studies have found that the value of an end
product may not be directly related to the amount of electrical energy used for all sectors
(e.g. a commercial enterprise may require the use of intelligent appliances such tills,
computers. These devices use relatively small quantities of energy, but their availability is
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important.) Therefore in many cases, continuity of supply rather than capacity is the most
important factor [Herman & Gaunt, 2008].
A CDF based on South African customer interruption cost data published by Herman &
Gaunt [2008] was used. In their publication, the customer interruption cost data for both
residential and commercial retail customers is given.
3.2.4 Economic Feasibility
This section of the study aims to determine the economic feasibility of the different smart
grid technologies and distributed generation, by calculating the discounted payback period
for the investment required to implement these techniques. The payback period refers to
the amount of time it takes to recover the initial investment of an opportunity. A commonly
used method to evaluate the economic feasibility of investments is the Net Present Value
(NPV) method. The advantage of this method is that it takes into consideration the time
value of money [Department of Ecology, 2005]. This method is used to determine the
discounted payback period.
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4 EXPERIMENT DESIGN
This chapter presents the experimental procedure used in investigating the reliability benefit of
smart grid technologies and distributed generation. The aim of this investigation is to determine
the impact of the smart grid techniques and distributed generation on reliability, as well as to
conduct a cost/benefit analysis of implementing these technologies into the system. The
approach used in evaluating distribution reliability, with and without smart grid
techniques/distributed generation of an identified test system, is described. It also outlines the
procedure followed in assessing reliability worth and economic feasibility.
4.1 COMPUTATIONAL TOOLS
The main computational software package used in this research project is MATLAB 2009b. It was
used to develop and execute the time sequential Monte Carlo Simulations. Microsoft Office
Excel 2007 was also used, particularly for curve fitting and regression analysis.
4.2 TEST SYSTEM
The test system used was feeder 1 (F1) of bus 6 of the RBTS system(More details of this bus and
the RBTS are given in Appendix B). This is illustrated in Figure 4-1. It consists of nineteen failure
components, a combination of 1 circuit breaker, 6 transformers(T1-T6) and 12 overhead lines
(O1-O12). There are 6 load points (LP1-LP6) present on this feeder. The feeder and overhead
line lengths are provided in Appendix B.
Figure 4-1 Test System [Billinton & Jonnavithula, 1996]
The protection devices within the test system are as follows:
 Circuit breaker- used to break short circuit current and operating currents. Breakers can
be operated remotely and can generally be operated multiple times.
 Fuses- fitted on both sides of each transformer. These are used to protect the rest of the
system in case of a transformer fault. The presence of fuses means that any transformer
failure affects only the load point, associated with that specific transformer. For
example, the failure of T1, results in the discontinued supply of electricity to LP1 but no
effect on the supply to LP2-LP6. Fuses have to be replaced after they have been
triggered.
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 Isolators (S1-S5)- used to isolate different sections of the feeder, particularly when a
fault has occurred.
4.3 RELIABILITY EVALUATION PROCEDURE
As mentioned in chapter 3, a time sequential Monte Carlo Simulation (MCS) was the selected
method used to evaluate the reliability of the selected test system. The basis of MCS is to
determine reliability indices based on repeated sampling of the state of the system. This sub-
section discusses the method used to model components, the assumptions made and the
simulation procedure followed.
4.3.1 Component Models and Parameters
Distribution system components (transmissions lines, transformers, breakers etc) can have
one of two states: an up state or a down state. The up state is when the component is
working as expected and the down state is when the component has failed [Billinton &
Wang, 1999b]. These states are shown in Figure 4-2.
Figure 4-2 State Space diagram of electrical components[Billinton & Wang, 1999b]
The process of transiting from up state to down state is called the failure process whereas
the transition from down state to up sate is called the restoration process. The time during
which the element remains in the up state is called the time to failure (TTF). The time
during which the element is in the down state is called the restoration time, and can either
be the time to replace or time to repair (TTR) [Billinton & Wang, 1999b]. These times can be
seen in Figure 4-3 below.
Figure 4-3 Typical operating history of component [Billinton & Wang, 1999b]
The failure and restoration processes may be modelled using probability distribution
functions.
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Another important component of the simulation process is the inclusion of fault
management activities. Fault location time was included in the simulation procedure and is
described as time to locate fault (TTLF). Therefore the Figure 4-3 may be modified as shown
in Figure 4-4.
Figure 4-4 Operating histories including time to locate fault
TTLF comprises of the duration it takes to conduct all fault management activities before the
actual faulted feeder section is repaired. These activities include fault notification,
dispatching of repair crew, travelling time, trial and error switching for manual fault location
and any decision making.
4.3.2 Assumptions
The following assumptions were made in the development of the MCS:
 The mission time was set to 1 year and the simulation period was 1000 years unless
otherwise stated.
 Smart grid techniques and fuses were assumed to operate without failure.
 The failure of a transformer only affects the load point connected to that specific
transformer. The fuses protect the rest of the system.
 Transformers may only be repaired and not replaced, unless otherwise stated.
 A failure of the circuit breaker affects all the load points, resulting in an outage duration
equal to the reclosing time of the breaker.
 A failure in the main feeder section results in an interruption of service to all load
points. Load points upstream have an outage duration equivalent to the time it takes to
locate the fault and conduct manual switching. Load points downstream have to wait for
the fault to located and for the faulted component to be repaired.
 Assuming constant failure rate, the Time To Failure (TTF) for all nineteen components in
the system was modelled using a negative exponential function given in equation4.1.
( ) = ( . )
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where λ is the failure rate of a component and t is the TTF.
therefore if equation 4.1 is rearranged:
TTF =
( ( ))
λ
(4.2)
 The failure rates of the transformers were randomly sampled from a beta distribution
for the simulation period.
Note: The failure rate for the transformers is constant during the mission time (1 year)
and each simulation period, allowing for the use of the negative exponential, which
assumes a constant failure rate in the specific year. But the failure rate of the
transformer changes randomly from one simulation period to the next.
 The failure rates of all components except the transformers were assumed to be
constant throughout the entire MCS.
4.3.3 Monte Carlo Simulation Algorithm
The simulation procedure executed was based on the algorithm developed by Billinton et
al.[1999] with a few modifications. A number of different cases were executed but the general
algorithm in each case followed the steps listed below:
Step 1: Randomly sample the failure rate for each transformer from a beta distribution.
Step 2: A uniformly distributed number was generated to represent f(t)for all failure
components.
Step 3: For each failure component the TTF is calculated using equation 4.2.
Step 4: The TTF for each component was compared to the mission time.
Step 5: If a failure occurred, (i.e. TTF is less than mission time) the load points affected
by the failure of the specific component were determined.
Step 6: The number of outages for each load point was noted.
Step 7: The outage duration for the affected load points was recorded and added to the
total outage time for each load point.
Step 8: The failure rate, repair rate and unavailability of the load point were then
obtained.
Step 9: If the simulation period had not elapsed then steps 1-8 were repeated.
Step 10: Calculate the number and duration of failure for each load point.
Step 11: Calculate the system indices and customer orientated indices.
Steps 1-11 were repeated 1000 times and at the end, 1000 values for the load point, system and
customer orientated distribution reliability indices were obtained. Each index was represented
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using the beta pdf. The outcome was a pdf representation of each index. The algorithm followed
is shown in the flow chart in Figure 4-5.
A number of cases were investigated each with different values for inputs, namely switching
time, repair duration, et cetera. The input criteria for each case used during the execution of the
MCS will be described in the chapter 5.
Table 4-1 outlines the reliability data concerning the components of the test system. These
values were adopted from Billinton & Jonnavithula [1996]. The different input parameters, their
details and distributions are shown below in Table 4-2. The input data was adopted from
Billinton & Jonnavithula [1996] and Alvehag [2008]. The maximum values of the input
parameters as indicated in Table 4-2 were estimated using the standard deviation of the
average, which  gives a measure of the dispersion from the average.
Table 4-1 Test system network components' failure rates
System
Component
Failure rate
(failures/year)
System
Component
Failure rate
(failures/year)
Circuit breaker 1 0.006 O7 0.04875
O1 0.04875 O8 0.039
O2 0.039 O9 0.039
O3 0.039 O10 0.04875
O4 0.052 O11 0.052
O5 0.04875 O12 0.039
O6 0.04875
Table 4-2 Input parameters for MCS
Input parameter Distribution Average Standard
deviation of mean
Maximum
Time To Failure
(TTF)
exponential - - -
Time To Locate Fault
(TTLF)
beta 1.5 hours 0.4 hours 2 hours
Repair time (RT/TTR)
overhead lines
breaker
transformer
beta
5hours
4hours
200 hours
1 hour
0.4 hours
10  hours
6 hours
5 hours
220 hours
Switching time(SwT) beta 1 hour 0.4 hour 1.5 hours
Reclosing time (RcT) beta 1 minute 1 minute 2minutes
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Figure 4-5Skeleton Algorithm of MCS
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4.4 RELIABILITY WORTH EVALUATION PROCEDURE
This sub-section describes the procedure followed to estimate the distribution reliability worth
of smart grid technologies and distributed generation. As mentioned in section 2.7 three distinct
models are required: reliability model, load model and cost model.
4.4.1 Reliability model
The reliability model implemented is the model described in section 4.3 above.
4.4.2 Load model
The customer model was developed using data from the RBTS data sheet and NRS data.
This study only considered residential and commercial customers. The customers at
each load point were defined as shown in Table 4-3below.
Table 4-3 Customers on the test system
Load point Number of
Customers
Type of Customers
1 138 138 Residential
2 126 126 Residential
3 138 138 Residential
4 126 126 Residential
5 120 118 Residential + 2Commercial
6 121 118 Residential + 3 Commercial
Total 769 764 Residential + 5 Commercial
 Residential Load model
NRS Load Research data was used in the development of the residential load model.
NRS Load Research data comprises of the load consumption data collected in 5 minute
intervals for different residential households in different locations in South Africa. This
data was collected between 1994 and 2003.Thedata was used to develop a profile of
the load consumption in amperes (A) of a residential customer residing in Claremont,
Johannesburg, South Africa. Four seasons of the year and different times of the day
were identified. The load profile is given in Figure 4-6.
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Figure 4-6 Load profile for a typical residential customer [NRS Load Research Group, 1994-2003]
The beta distribution was used to describe the load of each residential customer during
different seasons of the year and for every hour of the day. The resultant was a 24x4
matrix, each block containing a unique alpha and beta parameter for a specific beta
distribution describing the load of a residential household. This matrix is best described
in Table 4-4.
Table 4-4 Residential load model
Season
(months of
year) /
Time of day
Summer
(Mid October-
Mid February)
Autumn
(Mid February
-April)
Winter
(May to July)
Spring
(July to mid
October)
00:00 - 00:59 α1β1c1 α25β25c25 α49β49c49 α73β73c73
01:00 - 01:59 α2β2c2 α26β26c26 α50β50c50 α74β74c74
02:00 - 02:59 α3β3c3 α27β27c27 α51β51c51 α75β75c75
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
23:00-23:59 α24β24c24 α48β48c48 α72β72c72 α94β96c96
 Commercial load model
There are a total of 5 identical commercial customers on the feeder. There are 3
commercial customers on LP5 and the remaining 2 on LP6. All 5 were assumed to be in
the retail business. The loads of the commercial customers were time dependent and
remained the same regardless of the season of year. The load of these customers was
based on data given with the RBTS and this is indicated in Table 4-5.
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Table 4-5 Commercial customer Load data
Time of day Load per commercial
customer (MW)
00:00 -07:59 0.0497
08:00-17:00 0.085
17:00-23:59 0.0497
4.4.3 Cost model
As mentioned in chapter 3, customer damage functions (CDFs) based on customer
interruption cost data published by Herman & Gaunt [2008]were used. Two separate
CDFs were developed for each customer type. Figure 4-7 and Figure 4-8 depict the CDFs
for a typical residential and commercial customer respectively.
Figure 4-7 CDF for residential customers[Herman & Gaunt, 2008]
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Figure 4-8 CDF for commercial customers[Herman & Gaunt, 2008]
4.4.4 Reliability worth algorithm
The algorithm developed is similar to the algorithm used to evaluate reliability. The major
difference is that each time an interruption occurs; the faulted feeder component is
identified. For each load point affected by this faulted feeder section, the outage duration is
determined. Using this outage duration, the EENS of each load point is identified and
incremented. From there, the damage cost to the customer as a result of the interruption is
determined and incremented. This algorithm is illustrated in Figure 4-9.
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Figure 4-9 Algorithm used to determine reliability worth
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5 SIMULATION PROCEDURE
This chapter describes the different scenarios and cases simulated, as well as the input parameters
pertaining to each specific case.
5.1 RELIABILITY EVALUATION CASES
5.1.1 Aged transformers (Base case)
In this case, all failure components, including the transformers, in the tests system were
assumed to be operating during the worn out stage. Data for failure rates of distribution
transformers operating in the system with age was collected and plotted by Jagers & Tenbohlen
[2009]. This is shown in Figure 5-1. The graph plotted by Jagers & Tenbohlen [2009] does not
correspond to the bath tub curve (Figure 2-1), as the failure rate does not decrease in the
infancy stage, but instead from the first year of operation the failure rate is fairly constant. This
could be because the transformers were rigorously tested for manufacturing faults before their
installation.
In this case, the failure rates of transformers during the worn out stage were fitted to a beta
distribution. During the MCS, the failure rate of each transformer (T1-T6 in Figure 4-1) was
sampled from this distribution. It was assumed that the normal operating stage was from 1 to
33 years of age and that the wear out stage was from 33 to 40 years of age. All other input
parameters are the same as those given in Table 4-2.
Figure 5-1 Failure rate of transformers with age [Jagers & Tenbohlen, 2009]
5.1.2 Case 1: New transformers
The procedure executed in case 1 was exactly the same as that of the base case, with one
exception. The failure rate of each transformer (T1-T6 in Figure 4-1) was sampled from a beta
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distribution fitted to the failure rate data corresponding to the normal operating stage in Figure
5-1. All other input parameters are the same as those given in Table 4-2.
5.1.3 Case 2: Fault Passage Indicators and Distance to Fault Estimators (FPI and DFE)
In case 2, the impact of two smart grid technologies: distance to fault estimators and passage
fault locators working in collaboration was investigated. The fault passage indicators were
installed at each switching point (S1 to S6).It is assumed that these devices operate without fault
and that they communicate wirelessly with the substation operators. This results in less time
spent locating the fault. The exact same procedure described under 4.3.3 was followed. The only
difference was the reduction in time to locate faults (TTLF). Switching and isolating faults was
conducted manually. The only change to the input parameters given in Table 4-2, is shown in
Table 5-1.
Table 5-1 Input parameter change for case 2
Input parameter Distribution Average Standard
deviation
Maximum
Time To Locate
Fault (TTLF)
beta 0.5 hours 0.4 hours 2 hours
5.1.4 Case 3:Feeder Automation
This case investigated the effect of feeder automation on the feeder’s reliability. FDLISR is
performed each time a fault is detected. The changes to the input parameters are as follows:
Table 5-2Input parameter change for case 3
Input parameter Average
Time To Locate Fault
(TTLF)
30 seconds
Switching time(SwT) 30 seconds
5.1.5 Case 4: Distributed Generation-Solar PV
In this case, DG was added to the system. The DG technology integrated into the system was
solar PV (Photovoltaic)and was connected to the end of the feeder as shown in Figure 5-2. The
main purpose of this plant is to act as a backup source of power for LP5 and LP6 in case of an
interruption.  For example, if a permanent fault were to occur on O5, LP1 and LP2 would be
restored to the main source of supply by opening S2. Ordinarily without the presence of DG on
the feeder, LP3 to LP6 would have to wait for the faulted feeder section to be repaired. But due
to the solar PV plant, LP5 and LP6 can be supplied by opening S4 and closing S5 and S6. In the
event that the power output of the DG is not sufficient to supply both LP5 and LP6, S5 will be
opened and the DG will supply LP6 only. If the power output of the DG cannot supply LP6, then
both LP5 and LP6 will have to wait for the fault to be repaired.
The solar PV plant has been sized to 3MW, enabling it to supply both LP5 and LP6 independently
at peak load. LP5 and LP6 have a combined peak load of about 2.70MW. It should be noted that
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the solar PV plant is continuously feeding into the system i.e. S6 is a normally open switch. If the
power output from the solar PV plant cannot meet the demand of LP5 and LP6 at any point, the
remaining energy requirements are supplied by the utility. The implication of this is that in case
of an interruption, the solar PV plant can be used immediately, avoiding the start up delay
associated with starting up a PV plant.
Figure 5-2Test system including distributed generation
Solar PV model
It was mentioned in chapter 3, that a solar PV model dependent on time of day and season of
year was selected. Hourly solar insolation data for Johannesburg, South Africa, over a period of
one year, was used for in the development of the solar PV model. This data was retrieved online
from the Soda Service website [SoDa, 2005].
Equation 5.1 [Alkuhayli et al., 9-11 Sept. 2012] outlines the relationship between the power
output of the photovoltaic system, with surface area (S) and direct solari nsolation (I(t)). The
efficiency of the system is dependent on the amount of direct solar insolation available. When
the available direct solar insolation is below a certain threshold (called K), the relationship
between efficiency and solar insolation is linear. Above this threshold, the efficiency is generally
constant.
Pout(t) =
∗ S ∗ I(t) 0 < ( ) ≤ K
nc ∗ S ∗ I(t) I(t) >
(5.1)
where nc is the efficiency of the PV system including the inverter
K is the threshold. According to Cha et al. [2004], K is about 200 W/m2.
The general algorithm described in Figure 4-5is still applicable to load points 1 to 4. The
algorithm applied to load point 5 and 6 changed slightly. This change is described in Figure 5-3.
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Figure 5-3 Algorithm followed for case 4
5.1.6 Case 5:Feeder Automation and Distributed Generation
In this case, the combination of feeder automation and distributed generation was explored.
The input parameters of this case are the same as case 3 and the algorithm executed is that of
case 4.
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5.2 RELIABILITY WORTH
The reliability worth of each of the above mentioned cases was determined using the algorithm
described in 4.4.4.
5.3 RELIABILITY COST/BENEFIT ANALYSIS
The previous two sub sections of this chapter, discussed the simulation procedures carried out
in order to quantify the reliability and the reliability worth for the different identified smart grid
technologies, and the distributed generation. This section discusses the inputs, assumptions
made, and the steps followed in order to conduct a cost/benefit analysis of the different cases
compared to the base case. It should be noted that all monetary figures are 2013 values unless
indicated otherwise.
5.3.1 Case 1 :New transformers
This case investigated the impact of transformers working in the normal stage of operation on
the reliability of the feeder. In this stage the failure rate is relatively low and the failure rate is
more or less constant. In order to implement this case, six new transformers, to replace aged
distribution transformers T1 to T6, were required.
Table 5-3 Input investment costs for case 1
Cost per device Cost in US$ Cost in ZAR
11 kV/0.4 kV
5MVA
transformers
US$ 82 781.00
[MidWest
Switchgear Group,
2014]
US$ 82 781.00 X6 ZAR 82 7810.00 X6
Total cost US$ 496 686.00 ZAR 4 966 860.00
The conversion from US$ to ZAR assumed a ratio of 1US$=ZAR 10 [Standard Bank, 2013].
5.3.2 Case 2: Fault Passage Indicators and Distance to Fault Estimators
This case investigated the implementation of distance to fault estimators and fault current
passage indicators which could communicate remotely with a control centre. A distance to fault
estimator was installed at the substation. A fault passage indicator was installed along the
feeder at each switching point (S1-S5) of the test system shown in Figure 4-1. The cost of the an
upgraded communication system with enhance functions cable of supporting the distance to
fault estimator and fault passage indicator technologies is also included. The entire costs
involved in this case are shown in Table 5-4.
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Table 5-4 Input investment costs for case 2
Cost per device Cost in US$ Cost in ZAR
Distance to fault
estimator
US$ 2550.00 [Schweitzer
Engineering Laboratories,
2013]
US$ 2550 X 1
= US$ 2550
ZAR 25 000
Fault passage
indicator
US$ 15-50 for a set of 3
(Minimum order of 50 sets)
[Alibaba, 2013]
U$15 X 50
to US$50 X 50
= US$ 750 to
US$ 2500
ZAR 7500 to ZAR 25 000
Communication
system
US$ (2011) 20 000 per
feeder [EPRI, 2011]
This is equivalent to
US$ (2013) 21 150 [Officer
& Williamson, 2014]
US$ 21 150 ZAR 211 500
Total cost ZAR 244 000 to ZAR 261 500
5.3.3 Case 3: Feeder Automation
This case investigated the implementation of feeder automation. The cost of implementing
distribution feeder automation ranges from US $200 000 to US $300 000 per feeder [Uluski,
2013]. Therefore, the cost of implementing feeder automation in this case ranges from ZAR2
000 000.00 to ZAR3 000 000.00 (2 million to 3 million ZAR).
5.3.4 Case 4:Distributed Generation-Solar PV
This case investigated the impact of solar PV plant operating with intentional islanding, on the
reliability of the feeder. Table 5-5 shows the input data used to determine the cost of upgrading
an existing solar PV plant, with the necessary communication systems to include intentional
islanding.
Table 5-5 Input investment costs parameters for case 4
Input parameter Value
Cost per Watt Peak for solar PV US$ 0.9/Wp [IRENA, 2012]
Estimated additional cost per Watt Peak to
upgrade solar PV plant communication system to
include intentional islanding
US$  0.2/Wp
Using the above mentioned data, the cost of upgrading solar PV plant to include intentional
islanding is as follows:
=(0.2US$/Wp) x (10 ZAR/US$) X (3MW)
=ZAR 6 000 000 (6 million ZAR)
5.3.5 Case 5: Feeder Automation and Distributed Generation
In this case, feeder automation and distributed generation were both implemented. The
amounts used in cases3 and 4 above were used. The total investment cost required in this case
amounted to ZAR 8 000 000 to ZAR 9 000 000 (Approximately 8 million to 9 million ZAR).
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5.3.6 Economic Feasibility of cases
The average savings customer interruption costs were determined for each case. The present
value (PV) of these savings was determined using equation 5.2 [de Blas, 2006]. The discount
rate, mentioned in equation 5.2,is used to equate future values to current values. It was
assumed that the discount rate was equal to 10% [Khatib, 2010].
PV =
( )
(5.2)
In order to determine the discounted payback period, the present value of annual savings
realized was subtracted from the investment cost, until the initial investment cost was
completely paid backed.  The discounted payback period for each the different cases was then
compared.
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6 RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
This chapter presents and discusses the results for the different cases and scenarios described in
chapter 5 and is based on the assumptions and procedures given in chapter 4.
6.1 RELIABILITY EVALUATION
This sub section presents and discusses the findings of the reliability evaluation. The findings are
presented in the form of beta distributions describing the selected reliability indices: SAIFI,
feeder failure rate, SAIDI and feeder unavailability and MAIFI where applicable. The 10th, 50th
and 90th percentile values of each distribution are also given for comparison purposes. The
selected reliability indices were discussed in chapters 2 and 3, but are briefly described again
below:
i. SAIFI gives an indication of the average number of sustained interruptions that a typical
customer on the feeder would experience in one calendar year (NRS 048-6:20060).
ii. MAIFI is the average number of momentary interruptions that a typical customer on
the feeder would experience in one calendar year (NRS 048-6:2006).
iii. The feeder failure rate is the frequency with which a fault occurs on the feeder.
iv. SAIDI gives an indication of the average number of interruptions that a customer on the
feeder would experience in one calendar year.
v. The feeder unavailability is the total outage duration of the feeder
For simplicity the case names were abbreviated as follows:
Table 6-1 Case definitions and abbreviations
Case Abbreviated name Explores
Base case aged_tr Effect of transformers operating in worn out stage on feeder
reliability
1 new_tr Effect of transformers  operating in normal stage on feeder
reliability
2 FPI_DFE Effect of fault passage indicators and distance to fault
estimators on feeder reliability
3 Feeder_auto Effect of feeder automation feeder reliability on feeder
reliability
4 DG Effect of distributed generation feeder reliability on feeder
reliability
5 Feeder_auto_DG Effect of feeder automation and distributed generation
feeder reliability on feeder reliability
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6.1.1 Case aged_tr (Base case)and Case new_tr
i. SAIFI
The beta distributions of SAIFI for both case new_tr and case aged_tr are compared
in Figure 6-1. The bell shape of these distributions indicates that the possible
magnitudes of SAIFI are evenly distributed on either side of the mean value in each
case. The beta distribution for case new_tr is much sharper and narrower than that
of case aged_tr, because the failure rate of transformers and all other system
components in case new_tr is generally constant. This is different from case
aged_tr, where the possible transformer failure rates are more dispersed and higher
in magnitude. Another important observation is that the possible values for SAIFI in
case aged_tr are for the most part higher than those of case new_tr, and this is
expressed in the different percentile values of SAIFI for each case shown in Table
6-2. Once again, this is attributed to the increased transformer failure rate
experienced when transformers operate in the wear out region.
Figure 6-1 SAIFI comparison of case aged_tr and case new_tr
Table 6-2 SAIFI for case aged_tr and case new_tr
SAIFI (interruptions/customer year)
Percentile Case aged_tr
(Base case)
Case new_tr Percentage
difference
10th 0.60 0.53 -11.6%
50th 0.73 0.56 -23.3 %
90th 0.84 0.59 -29.8%
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ii. Feeder failure rate
A comparison of the feeder failure rate for both cases new_tr and aged_tr is given in
Figure 6-2. The observations made regarding SAIFI are also applicable to the feeder
failure rate. The possible range of feeder failure rate magnitudes in case aged_tr are
higher than those of case new_tr due to the higher transformer failure rate as a
result of the worn-out, aged transformers.
Figure 6-2 Feeder failure rate comparison of case aged_tr and case new_tr
Table 6-3 Feeder failure rate for case aged_tr and new_tr
Feeder failure rate (λfeeder) (interruptions/year)
Percentile Case aged_tr
(Base case)
Case new_tr Percentage
difference
10th 3.61 3.19 -11.6%
50th 4.39 3.38 -23.0%
90th 5.05 3.53 -30.0%
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iii. SAIDI
In Figure 6-3 the beta distributions describing SAIDI for both case new_tr and case
aged_tr are compared. The distribution of SAIDI for case aged_tr incorporates a
wider range of values than that of case new_tr, and as a result, the distribution for
case new_tr is not clearly visible. Therefore Figure 6-4 was included and depicts a
close up representation of this distribution.
From these two figures, it is observable that the shape of the two beta distributions
is different. The exponential shape of the beta distribution in case aged_tr indicates
that most possible values of SAIDI in that case are less than its mean. The difference
in the percentile values in case new_tr and case aged_tr are for the most part much
larger. The main reason behind this is the failure rate of the transformers. The
transformers in case aged_tr are assumed to be worn out and aged, and therefore
are more prone to failing. The transformers also have a much longer repair time, of
about 200hours, followed by overhead lines, with a repair time of about 5 hours.
Therefore an increased transformer failure rate, as experienced in case aged_tr,
results in a tremendous increase in the outage duration experienced by customers.
This drastic increase in outage duration is reflected in SAIDI.
From Table 6-4, the 10th percentile of SAIDI in case new_tr is higher than that of
case aged_tr because of the much narrower range of values.
Figure 6-3 SAIDI comparison of case aged_tr and case new_tr
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Figure 6-4 SAIDI comparison of case aged_tr and case new_tr(close up)
Table 6-4 SAIDI for case aged_tr and new_tr
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SAIDI (hours/customer year)
Percentile Case aged_tr
(Base case)
Case new_tr Percentage
difference
10th 0.04 0.15 +275%
50th 3.58 0.26 -92.7 %
90th 26.62 0.38 -98.6 %
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iv. Unavailability
The feeder unavailability for the two different cases is compared in Figure 6-5 and a
close up is shown in Figure 6-6. Similar observations made regarding SAIDI above
may be made for the feeder unavailability. The unavailability hours for the feeder
system with worn out transformers (case aged_tr),are much longer than that of the
system with transformers operating in their normal life period (case new_tr).The
worn out transformers result in a higher feeder failure rate and hence an increased
outage duration. As observed with SAIDI above, the 10th percentile of the feeder
unavailability (shown in Table 6-5) in case new_tr is higher than that of case aged_tr
because of the much narrower range of possible values.
Figure 6-5 Feeder unavailability comparison of case aged_tr and case new_tr
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Figure 6-6 Feeder unavailability comparison of case aged_tr and case new_tr
Table 6-5 Feeder unavailability for case aged_tr and case new_tr
Feeder Unavailability ( Us) (hours/year)
Percentile Case aged_tr
(Base case)
Case new_tr Percentage
difference
10th 0.28 0.89 +217.8%
50th 22.48 1.58 -92.9 %
90th 157.40 2.29 -98.5 %
A crucial observation seen in the comparison of case new_tr and case aged_tr  is that,
the observations noted for SAIFI were also applicable to feeder failure rate and vice
versa. The same applies to SAIDI and the feeder unavailability. This carried through to
the remaining cases, indicating that SAIFI gives a good reflection of the feeder failure
rate and SAIDI, the feeder unavailability. This is expected, as SAIFI and SAIDI are the
respective scaled down values of the feeder failure rate and feeder unavailability
respectively. Therefore the remaining distributions of feeder failure rate and
unavailability for the remaining cases will be presented in Appendix C.
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6.1.2 Case aged_tr and case FPI_DFE
i. SAIFI
The beta distributions describing the magnitudes of SAIFI for the case aged_tr and
case FPI_DFE are shown in Figure 6-7. It is apparent from this figure that there is no
significant change in this reliability index. The spread and shape of the two
distributions is similar and the change in value of SAIFI at the different percentiles as
shown in Table 6-6 is negligible. It can be seen that the incorporation of distance to
fault estimators and fault current passage indicators has no impact on the systems
average failure frequency. This is expected because these two devices do not affect
the state or condition of the main system components, but instead assist in the
location of faults, after an interruption has occurred. They do not help prevent or
decrease the occurrence of faults.
The slight difference in the two distributions and their percentile values is
insignificant and could be attributed to slight statistical differences during the
execution of the MCS.
Figure 6-7 SAIFI comparison of case aged_tr and case FPI_DFE
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Table 6-6 SAIFI for case aged_tr and case FPI_DFE
SAIFI (interruptions/customer year)
Percentile Case aged_tr
(Base case)
Case FPI_DFE Percentage
difference
10th 0.60 0.60 0%
50th 0.73 0.72 +1.3 %
90th 0.84 0.82 2.4 %
ii. SAIDI
Unlike the failure rate of the feeder and SAIFI, the SAIDI in case FPI_DFE does differ
from the SAIDI of the case aged_tr. This change is not very evident in Figure 6-8, but
it can be seen in Table 6-7 in the 10th and 50th percentile values. This decrease in
SAIDI from case aged_tr to case FPI_DFE is as a result of the installation of the
distance to fault estimators and fault current passage indicators, which contribute
towards decreasing the interruption duration, by assisting in the fault finding
process. The 90th percentile value in both cases is very similar, indicating that the
overall change in SAIDI is very modest.
Figure 6-8 SAIDI comparison of case aged_tr and case FPI_DFE
Table 6-7 SAIDI for case aged_tr and case FPI_DFE
SAIDI (hours/customer year)
Percentile Case aged_tr
(Base case)
Case FPI_DFE Percentage
difference
10th 0.05 0.02 -60 %
50th 3.79 3.33 -12.1 %
90th 26.64 26.5 0.52 %
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
SAIDI (hours/customer year)
P
ro
ba
bi
lit
y 
D
en
si
ty
Beta Distribution of SAIDI
aged tr (Base case): Alpha= 0.37022 Beta= 2.5058 C= 70.0692
FPI&DFE : Alpha= 0.33019 Beta= 1.8637 C= 58.641
Page | 64
6.1.3 Case aged_tr and case feeder_auto
i. SAIFI
Unlike in case FPI_DFE, the implementation of feeder automation does result in a
decrease the frequency of failures on the system. The comparison of the SAIFI beta
distributions for case aged_tr and feeder_auto is shown in Figure 6-9. The
difference in the SAIFI at the different percentiles is significant, as depicted in Table
6-9. Feeder automation implements fault location and isolation. It then restores
electrical energy supply to customers who need not be disconnected from the main
supply. This group of customers instead experience a momentary interruption,
where they previously would have experienced a sustained interruption. Therefore
the implementation of feeder automation sees a decrease in SAIFI which is a
measure of the frequency of sustained interruptions experience by each customer
in the system in one calendar and an increase in MAIFI, the measure of the
frequency of momentary interruptions per customer in one calendar year.
Figure 6-9 SAIFI comparison of case aged_tr and case feeder_auto
Table 6-8 SAIFI for case aged_tr and case feeder_auto
SAIFI (interruptions/customer year)
Percentile Case aged_tr
(Base case)
Case feeder_auto Percentage
difference
10th 0.60 0.37 -38.3 %
50th 0.73 0.49 -32.9 %
90th 0.84 0.60 -28.6 %
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ii. SAIDI
The distributions describing SAIDI for the case aged_tr and case feeder_auto are
shown below in Figure 6-10. The decrease in SAIDI illustrated by the percentage
difference in the 10th and 50th percentile, show that feeder automation has a
positive impact on the overall interruption duration experience by customers.
Feeder automation detects and isolates faults within 1 minute, allowing customers
whose energy supply can be immediately restored via switching, to be reconnected
in a shorter period of time. It also facilitates in the quick identification of faults to be
attended to by the repair crew. These operations are responsible for the decrease in
SAIDI.
Figure 6-10 SAIDI comparison of case aged_tr and case feeder_auto
Table 6-9 SAIDI for case aged_tr and case feeder_auto
SAIDI (hours/customer year)
Percentile Case aged_tr
(Base case)
Case feeder_auto Percentage
difference
10th 0.05 0.01 -80 %
50th 3.79 2.70 -28.8 %
90th 26.64 26.02 2.3 %
The implementation of feeder automation only affects the fault location and
switching time. In case aged_tr, the average switching time and fault location time is
about 2.5 hours and this is reduced to about 1 minute in case feeder_auto. This is
highly beneficial for load points upstream to a fault, as they can be restored to the
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main power supply within a minute. On the other hand, load points downstream to
a fault, still have to wait a substantial amount on time for the faulted feeder
component to be repaired. Feeder automation has no impact on the repair time of
the components, which ranges from 4 hours for circuit breakers, to 200 hours for
transformers. Therefore the decrease in SAIDI in this case, is a reflection of the
decrease in fault location time, which is only a fraction of the total outage time per
interruption. In order to realize a much greater decrease in SAIDI, the repair time of
the different components needs to be decreased, or alternative means of energizing
the downstream load points affected by the fault needs to be implemented.
iii. MAIFI
With the implementation of feeder automation, the detection and isolation of faults
on the feeder may be carried out with 1 minute. This means that customers not
directly affected by a fault, may now experience a momentary interruption, unlike
before, when switching was performed manually. The beta distribution given in
Figure 6-11 describes MAIFI.  About 31 % of the average number interruptions in
this case, which would have been sustained interruptions prior to the
implementation of feeder automation, are now momentary. The slight difference in
the magnitude of MAIFI varies from the 10th to 90th percentile, indicates that the
distribution has a small range and that most values of MAIFI are close to its average
value.
Figure 6-11 MAIFI beta distribution for case feeder_auto
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Table 6-10 MAIFI for case feeder_auto
MAIFI (momentary interruptions/year)
Percentile Case feeder_auto
10th 0.21
50th 0.22
90th 0.24
6.1.4 Case aged_tr and case DG
i. SAIFI
As with the case FPI_DFE, the reliability index, SAIFI did not differ from the base
case. The comparison is depicted in Figure 6-12 and Table 6-11. Distributed
generation is implemented to supply energy to LP5 and LP6 in the event of an
interruption. It does not assist in preventing the occurrence of faults. Therefore, as
experienced with distance to fault estimators, fault passage detectors and feeder
automation, distributed generation plays no role in the avoidance of faults.
Figure 6-12 SAIFI comparison for case aged_tr and case DG
Table 6-11 SAIFI for case aged_tr and case DG
SAIFI (interruptions/customer year)
Percentile Case aged_tr
(Base case)
Case DG Percentage
difference
10th 0.60 0.60 0 %
50th 0.73 0.72 1.3 %
90th 0.84 0.83 1.1 %
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1 1.2
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
SAIFI (interruptions/year)
P
ro
ba
bi
lit
y 
D
en
si
ty
Beta Distribution of SAIFI
aged tr (Base Case) : Alpha= 19.9558 Beta= 10.0865 C= 1.0949
DG : Alpha= 18.1666 Beta= 8.2306 C= 1.0435
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i. SAIDI
The beta distributions of SAIDI for both case new_tr and case DG are given in Figure
6-13. The solar PV plant was sized to supply and restore LP5 and LP6 in the event
that an interruption was to occur upstream to these load points. Fault location and
switching times were the same as those in the case aged_tr. In order to further
highlight the impact of the DG on LP5 and LP6, the comparison of the average
unavailability of LP1,LP5 and LP6 is given in Table 6-13.
Figure 6-13 SAIDI comparison of case aged_tr and case DG
Table 6-12 SAIDI for case aged_tr and case DG
SAIDI (hours/customer year)
Percentile Case aged_tr
(Base case)
Case DG Percentage
difference
10th 0.05 0.00 -100 %
50th 3.79 1.57 -58.6 %
90th 26.64 32.75 +22.9 %
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As already mentioned, the solar PV plant acts as a backup power source for LP5 and
LP6 if an interruption were to occur upstream to either or both of these load points.
The impact of the distributed generation on the average unavailability of LP1, LP5
and LP6 is given in Table 6-13. As can be seen, the impact of the distributed
generation on LP1 is small and negligible. On the other hand, the impact on LP5 and
LP6 is substantial. This shows that locally, distributed generation does contribute
towards the decreasing outage duration.
Table 6-13 Average Unavailability of Load points 1,5 and 6
Average value of
index
Base case Case 5 Percentage
difference
ULoadpoint1 15.8 15.6 -1.2 %
ULoadpoint5 10.2 7.8 -23.5 %
ULoadpoint6 8.7 7.2 -17.2 %
Another observation from Table 6-13 above, is that distributed generation had more
of an impact on the average unavailability of LP6, than on that of LP5. This is
because, in the event that an interruption occurs upstream to LP5 and LP6,
preference is given to LP6. So if the power output of the solar PV plant at that
moment cannot meet the demand of both load points, but can only sufficiently
supply one of them, LP6 is given preference.
Currently in South Africa, renewable power plants are prohibited from connecting to
the distribution or transmission grid through islanding operation for safety reasons .
They are in fact required to shut down immediately upon the detection of an
islanded operation [RSA Grid Code Secretariat, 2012]. This regulation therefore
limits the implementation of the scenario presented in this case.
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6.1.5 Case aged_tr and case feeder_auto_DG
i. SAIFI
The same observation noted in case feeder_auto regarding SAIFI, is also applicable
in this case. The application of distributed generation in union with feeder
automation does result in a decrease in SAIFI. The observed decrease in SAIFI in
similar to that of case feeder_auto, with a slight decrease in SAIFI. This further
decrease is brought about by the combination of DG and feeder auto. This decrease
SAIFI is brought about by the feeder automation which implements automatic fault
location, isolation and service restoration and DG which can now supply LP5 and/or
LP6 preventing them from experiencing sustained interruptions in a number of
different circumstances. This is further explained under MAIFI for this case.
Figure 6-14 SAIFI comparison of case aged_tr and case feeder_auto_DG
Table 6-14 SAIFI for case aged_tr and case feeder_auto_DG
SAIFI (interruptions/customer year)
Percentile Case aged_tr
(Base case)
Case
feeder_auto_DG
Percentage
difference
10th 0.60 0.35 -41.6 %
50th 0.73 0.47 -35.6 %
90th 0.84 0.58 -31.0 %
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ii. SAIDI
The impact of distributed generation and feeder automation on SAIDI is the most
significant of all the cases excluding case new_tr. The combined effect of feeder
automation and distribution generation on the system impacts the fault location
time and restoration time for LP5 and LP6, as experienced in case feeder_auto and
case DG.
Figure 6-15 SAIDI comparison of case aged_tr and case feeder_auto_DG
Table 6-15 SAIDI for case aged_tr and case feeder_auto_DG
SAIDI (hours/customer year)
Percentile Case aged_tr
(Base case)
Case
feeder_auto_DG
Percentage difference
10th 0.05 0.00 -100 %
50th 3.79 0.69 -81 %
90th 26.64 21.65 -18.7 %
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The average unavailability of LP1,LP5 and LP6 is shown in Table 6-16. This
combination of feeder automation and distributed generation has a greater impact
on the feeder as a whole and on LP5 and LP6. Case feeder_auto illustrated that
feeder automation decreases the unavailability of the feeder as whole, because it
impacts all the load points, hence the decrease in the average unavailability of load
point 1 in this case. Case DG showed that the solar PV plant significantly impacts LP5
and LP6 only. The addition of feeder automation to the distributed generation
further improves the feeder unavailability of LP5 and LP6 from case DG to case
feeder_auto_DG. This goes to show that feeder automation facilitates the operation
and incorporation of distributed generation into the grid, when it is used as a
backup source of power.
Table 6-16 Average Unavailability of load points 1, 5 and 6
Average value of
index
Base case Case 5 Case6
ULoadpoint1 15.8 15.6 10.5
ULoadpoint5 10.2 7.8 6.1
ULoadpoint6 8.7 7.2 4.5
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iii. MAIFI
The momentary interruptions increased from case feeder_auto to case
feeder_auto_DG. This is due to the presence of distributed generation on the
feeder, which could potentially supply load point 5 and/or load point6 in the event
of an interruption. For example, previously in case feeder_auto, without the
inclusion of DG, a permanent fault on O7, would result in a momentary interruption
for LP1-LP3 and a sustained interruption for LP4,LP5 and LP6. But due to the
presence of DG in case feeder_auto_DG, LP5 and LP6 will only experience a
momentary interruption, depending on whether the power generation available
from solar PV plant can supply the load on LP5 and LP6.
The average number of sustained interruptions decreased from case feeder_auto to
case feeder_auto_DG. Momentary interruptions now account for 36 % of the
interruptions in the system, compared to 31 % in case feeder_auto.
Figure 6-16 MAIFI comparison of case feeder_auto and case feeder_auto_DG
Table 6-17 MAIFI for case feeder_auto and case feeder_auto_DG
MAIFI (momentary interruptions/customer year)
Percentile Case feeder_auto Case
feeder_auto_DG
Percentage
difference
10th 0.21 0.24 +14.2 %
50th 0.22 0.26 +18.2 %
90th 0.24 0.28 +16.6 %
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6.2 RELIABILITY WORTH EVALUATION
This sub section presents and discusses the findings of the reliability worth evaluation. The findings
are presented in the form of beta distributions and average values of two reliability indices: EENS
and the customer interruption costs. The average values are given in order to get a sense of the
expected losses in energy and cost per year. EENS, the Expected Energy Not Served, is the average
amount of energy not supplied to the customer as a result of an outage. It is dependent on the load
of the customer at the time when an interruption occurred. The customer interruption costs are the
monetary losses incurred by the customer due to the unavailability of electricity.
6.2.1 EENS (All cases)
The comparison of the EENS for all six cases is made in the distributions given in
Figure 6-17.
Figure 6-17 EENS comparison of all cases
Table 6-18 Average value of EENS for all cases
Case Average value of EENS
(kWh/year)
Percentage difference
from base case
aged_tr (base case) 58 848.92 -
new_tr 11 392.73 -80.6 %
FPI_ FDE 54 553.47 -7.3 %
feeder_auto 53 656.91 -8.8 %
DG 48 096.73 -18.3 %
feeder_auto_DG 47 189.09 - 19.8 %
The narrow range of EENS distribution for case new_tr indicates that the EENS is more or
less constant and does not vary significantly. This stems from the failure rate of each
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18
x 10
4
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
3.5
Expected Energy Not Served(kWh/year)
P
ro
ba
bi
lit
y 
D
en
si
ty
Beta Distribution of EENS of Feeder
new tr: Alpha= 9.2366 Beta= 5.4491 C= 18113.828
aged tr: Alpha= 1.4465 Beta= 2.4228 C= 157416.5436
FPI & DFE: Alpha= 1.3638 Beta= 2.774 C= 165517.1175
Feeder auto: Alpha= 1.1984 Beta= 2.2597 C= 158083.0993
DG: Alpha= 1.4395 Beta= 3.1505 C= 153360.7052
Feeder auto & DG: Alpha= 1.3236 Beta= 2.4503 C= 134544.6726
Page | 75
component in this case, which is more or less constant. The other cases have distributions
with a wider range because of the large variability of the failure rate of the transformers.
As expected, the base case has the highest average EENS, because in this case no
techniques have been put into place to try and improve the system reliability.
The difference in EENS between case new_tr and all other cases is very large because the
EENS is directly related to the outage duration. The highest decrease in outage duration is
observed in case new_tr and this decrease is therefore carried through to the EENS.
An important observation is the difference in EENS in cases feeder_auto and DG. For all 3
percentile values, the decrease in SAIDI in case feeder_auto was greater than that of case
DG, particularly at the 50th percentile. But the decrease in EENS in case DG is significantly
greater than that of case feeder_auto. This is related to the loads of LP5 and LP6 which are
much larger than that of the other load points.  These two load points contain residential
and commercial customers, unlike all the other load points which only contain the former.
The DG is dedicated towards supplying LP5 and LP6 in the event of an interruption. In case
feeder_auto, there was quicker fault detection and switching but the absence of DG still
resulted in lengthy interruption durations of load points like LP5 and LP6, which did not
have access to alternate sources of electricity, in the event on upstream faults. An
alternative option in the form of DG, results in a decrease in the outage duration
experienced by these load points (LP5 and LP6) and since they carry the greatest loads on a
system, the decrease in EENS in that case will be more substantial.
The next observation entails the difference in EENS between cases feeder_auto and
feeder_auto_DG. Both these cases consider the implementation of feeder automation, but
case feeder_auto explores the implementation of feeder automation independently. The
addition of DG to that system resulted in a modest decrease in SAIDI and but a significant
decrease in EENS. The key reason behind this is also the magnitude of the loads of LP5 and
LP6, which are greater than all other load points. The DG can now supply LP5 and LP6 in
instances (e.g. a fault in O5) where these load points previously had to wait for a faulted
feeder section to be repaired. Therefore, a decrease in the unavailability of these two load
points will result in a more significant impact on the EENS as observed in Table 6-18.
Page | 76
6.2.2 Expected Customer interruption Cost
The annual customer interruption costs for all the customers on the feeder are described by
the beta distributions in Figure 6-18.
Figure 6-18 Customer interruption costs for feeder for all cases
The narrow range and shape of the beta distribution of the case new_tr once again stems
from the fact that the failure rate of all the test system components fairly constant and
hence the variability in component failures is low. The range of values for the customer
interruption costs experienced in this case is also the smallest, as the number interruptions
is low. This is all a result of the low failure rate of the components in the system. A
decreased failure rate assists in decreasing the total unavailability and interruption costs of
the system.
The highest costs are experienced in case aged_tr and case FPI & FDE because case aged_tr
contains no techniques to try and decrease the frequency or duration of interruptions, and
the FPI & FDE have a relatively small impact on the duration of interruptions i.e. SAIDI. The
large variability in the transformers’ failure rate contributes towards the large range of the
distribution. The same is applicable to all the other cases except case new_tr.
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Table 6-19 Average customer interruption costs for all cases
There are some similarities between the EENS and the customer interruption costs. The
greatest decline in interruption costs is observed in case new_tr followed by case
feeder_auto_DG and DG. This observation is applicable to the EENS. Same as the EENS, the
costs incurred by the customer incurred in the absence of electricity supply, are interruption
duration dependent. A decrease in the unavailability of the system carries through to the
interruption costs. The largest decrease in unavailability is experienced in case new_tr and
the same applies to the interruption costs.
Cases DG and feeder_auto_DG have a greater impact on the customer interruption cost
outside of case new_tr. These two cases have a larger impact on the decrease in the
unavailability of LP5 and LP6, which contain commercial customers. The costs incurred per
hour without electricity supply are much higher for commercial customers than those for
residential customers. Therefore the implementation of DG provides an alternate source of
energy supply dedicated towards decreasing the outage duration of these load points. This
will therefore result in a substantial decrease in the interruption costs of the feeder. This
observation also highlights the sensitivity of customer interruption costs to the type of
customers on the feeder.
The next sub section analyses of the feasibility of investing in the different technologies listed in
the different cases.
Case Average value of ECOST
(ZAR/year)
Percentage difference
compared to base case
aged_tr (base case) 1 186 994.46 -
new_tr 305 869.50 -74.23%
FPI_FDE 1 159 923.87 -2.28%
feeder_auto 1 096 321.65 -7.64%
DG 1 031 833.97 -13.07%
feeder_auto_DG 906 885.70 23.60%
Page | 78
6.3 ECONOMIC FEASIBILITY EVALUATION
The average annual savings in customer interruption costs were determined and used to
determine the payback period for the different cases and this is given in the table below.
Table 6-20 Discounted payback period
From Table 6-20 it is evident that cases new_tr and FPI_DFE have the shorter payback periods.
Although case FPI _DFE has one of the shorter discounted payback periods, the distance to fault
estimators and fault passage indicators had the smallest effect on the duration of interruptions
and no impact on the frequency of interruptions.
Cases feeder_auto, DG and feeder_auto_DG, require much larger investment costs and have
longer discounted payback periods. An important point to highlight is that the average life of a
small solar PV plant ranges from 25 to 30 years [Alsema et al., 2009; Lin-Lin, 2012]. It would not
be feasible to invest in a project to upgrade a solar PV plant to include islanding communication
methods, when the payback period of this investment is longer than that of the life of the solar
PV plant. Nonetheless this decision remains in the hands of the investor.
Simply looking at the payback periods, the most feasible option would be to implement case
new_tr which would require the purchasing and installation of new distribution transformers.
This case has a maximum discounted payback period of about 7 years and the greatest annual
savings per year. The implementation of new transformers drastically decreases the both the
frequency and duration of interruption. The greatest decrease in SAIFI, SAIDI, EENS and
customer interruption cost was observed in this case. The shape of the beta distributions
describing these indices for case new_tr were bell shaped, with narrow range, indicating small
variability. The average design lifetime of a typical distribution transformer, depending on its
operating conditions, ranges from 30 to 35 years [Blackburn, 2007; Yazdani-Asrami et al.,
2011]making this case the most financially feasible.
Case Average annual
savings
(ZAR/year)
Cost to implement (ZAR) Discounted Payback
Period (years)
Minimum Maximum Minimum Maximum
new_tr 881 125.00 4 966 860 - 7 -
FPI _FDE 27 070.59 244 000 261 500 11 12
feeder_auto 90 672.81 2 000 000 3 000 000 29 45
DG 155 160.50 6000000 - 38 -
feeder_auto_DG 280 108.80 8000000 9000000 38 43
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Sensitivity analysis
A brief sensitivity analysis considering three different scenarios was conducted in this sub
section.
Scenario i
This scenario considers the effect of the TTLF on the interruption costs experienced in the base
case.
Table 6-21 Effect of TTLF on average ECOST scenario 1 -sensitivity analysis
Table 6-21 gives an indication of how TTLF affects the average customer interruption costs. The
TTFL value considered in the base case is reduced to a quarter of its original value i.e. 0.375
hours and increased to up to four times its value, at 6 hours. The results of this table show that a
decrease in the TTLF translates to a decrease in the experienced customer interruption costs.
The opposite is also applicable. A key observation is that halving the value of the TTLF results in
a small decrease in the customer interruption costs and doubling it, results in a small increase.
Even when the TTLF is tripled and even quadrupled, the corresponding increase in the average
ECOST is still minimal. This indicates that the TTLF parameter has minimal impact on the
customer interruptions costs, which are outage duration dependent. When an outage occurs,
the time take to repair a components accounts for the more significant portion of the outage
time than the time taken to repair a fault. This is translated to the interruptions costs and is
confirmed in the  sensitivity analysis results given in Table 6-21.
Scenario ii
The customer interruption costs are directly dependent on the outage duration. As mentioned
in chapter 4, it was assumed that transformers were repaired and not replaced in the event of a
fault. The average repair time was about 200hours, which is equivalent to about 9 days, which is
not common in modern day South Africa for a residential area for medium to high income
household. In this brief analysis, it was assumed that a faulted aged transformer was instead
replaced with another aged transformer. The replacement time was set to about 9 hours. The
impact of this change on the payback period is shown in Table 6-22.
Aged_tr (Base case)
Average TTLF
(hours)
Average value of ECOST
(ZAR/year)
Percentage difference (%)
1.5 1 186 994.46 reference value
0.375 1 137 565.04 -4.16
0.75 1 148 112.14 -3.28
3 1 195 769.70 0.74
4.5 1 213 240.91 2.21
6 1 231 682.33 3.76
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Table 6-22 Discounted payback periods for all cases of scenario 2 -sensitivity analysis
F
From Table 6-22, it is evident that the discounted payback period for the investments in all the
cases has increased and for case DG and case feeder_auto_DG it has more than tripled. The
increase in the discounted payback period stems from the decrease in the outage duration.
Substituting 200hours with 9 hours in the analysis resulted in an overall decrease in the outage
duration. The costs are dependent on outage duration. Therefore a decrease in outage duration
also results in a decrease in the customer interruption costs involved. Nonetheless the
extremely lengthy payback periods of the all the cases, would deem them unfeasible.
Scenario iii
This scenario considers a situation whereby the transformers are not aged but are instead
operating in the normal stage of operation and are maintained regularly. This is the base case in
this scenario. The fault passage indicators, distance to fault estimators and the necessary
communication systems were implemented in one case and in the other, feeder automation.
These results are shown in Table 6-23 . Compared to the results in Table 6-20, where aged
transformers were considered, the discounted payback periods  in this scenario are much
longer. This is attributed to the avoided interruptions brought about by the presence of non
aged transformers and the decrease in the duration of interruptions experienced as a result of
distance to fault estimators, fault passage indicator and feeder automation.  This result
highlights that the bulk of the interruption costs are incurred due to the aging infrastructure and
not from the lack of more modern grid techniques. This results also points out that the  before
mentioned smart grid techniques may not be financially feasible even within a system with non
aged transformers.
Table 6-23 Discounted payback periods for cases of scenario 3- sensitivity analysis
Case Average annual
savings
(ZAR/year)
Cost to implement (ZAR) Discounted Payback
Period (years)
Minimum Maximum Minimum Maximum
new_tr 72 434.11 4 966 860 - 99 -
FPI _DFE 12 182.17 244 000 261 500 26 28
feeder_auto 52 679.18 2 000 000 3 000 000 52 81
DG 54 973.30 6000000 - 165 -
feeder_auto_DG 101 857.00 8000000 9000000 115 131
Case ECOST Average
annual
savings
(ZAR/year)
Cost to implement
(ZAR)
Discounted Payback
Period (years)
Minimum Maximum Minimum Maximum
new_tr ( new
base case) 305 869.50 -
- - - -
new_tr &
FPI_DFE 298 416.72 7 452.78
244 000 261 500 44 48
new_tr &
feeder auto 265 721.18 40 148.32
2 000 000 3 000 000 70 109
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7 CONCLUSION
This chapter concludes the dissertation and discusses the validity of the hypothesis. It also
highlights the limitations of the selected approach.
The primary aim of this dissertation was to determine the potential reliability benefit of smart grid
technologies and distributed generation on a South Africa distribution feeder. This required the
evaluation of reliability of a test system and the selection of smart grid and distributed generation
technologies. The impact of these technologies on reliability worth was also evaluated.
7.1 IMPACT ON RELIABILITY AND RELIABILITY WORTH OF SYSTEM
The reliability evaluation of the selected test system was conducted for different cases. The
output of this evaluation was reliability indices, which give an indication of the reliability of the
system. Aging infrastructure was identified in literature as the key challenge faced by the South
Africa power industry.  This led to the incorporation of aged infrastructure in the form of aged
transformers in to the system.
A number of smart grid technologies, which affect distribution reliability, were identified and
their impact was incorporated into the system. These smart grid technologies were distance to
fault estimators, fault passage indicators and feeder automation. The effect of distributed
generation in the form of solar PV, with and without feeder automation on the distribution
reliability was also explored.
A probabilistic approach was selected for the analysis and a time sequential MCS was
developed.
Based on the research findings, the following can be concluded:
i. Aged transformers drastically increase the frequency of interruptions experienced in the
system, as they are more prone to failure. This was illustrated by the comparison of
SAIFI in case new_tr and case aged _tr. The likelihood of failure in the system with aged
transformers was order of magnitudes higher. This is reflected by the difference in SAIFI
and the feeder failure rate in these cases.
ii. The aged transformers also significantly increased the unavailability of the feeder
because the average repair time of the transformers is very large (about 200hours). This
observation was apparent in the comparison of SAIDI for case new_tr and case aged_tr.
The transformers in case aged_tr failed much more often than those in case new_tr.
Each time there was a transformer failure, an outage duration equivalent to the repair
time of 200hours was experienced. This drastically affected SAIDI and the feeder
unavailability.
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iii. The distance to fault estimators, fault passage indicators and feeder automation smart
grid technologies contributed towards decreasing the outage of duration of the test
system by assisting in fault management and location activities. This impact, although
noticeable, was very modest. During the time taken to restore energy to customers
after the occurrence of an interruption, most time is spent repairing the fault. Distance
to fault estimators and fault passage indicators reduce fault location time from an
average of 1.5 hours to 0.5 hours. Whereas feeder automation reduces fault location
time to about 30seconds. In a system with a high transformer failure, this impact is
minimal, as the transformer repair time is about 200hours. Even if the TTLF could be
reduced to 0 seconds, consumers would still have to wait 5 hours for an overhead line
to be repaired or even, 200hours in the event of a transformer failure. A greater impact
on the reduction of the outage duration is only realized when faults are avoided and
prevented altogether, as observed in case new_tr.
iv. The decrease in feeder outage duration, as a result of the implementation of the
identified smart grid technologies and distributed generation, is carried through to the
EENS and the customer interruption costs of the feeder.
The cases with the higher outage duration also experienced the higher EENS and
interruption costs. This is because these two factors are dependent on outage duration.
v. The implementation of distance to fault estimators, fault passage indicators and
distributed generation do not have an impact on SAIFI. This is because in the study, the
effect of these technologies would only come into effect after a fault has arisen and an
interruption has occurred. These technologies did not in any manner contribute towards
the avoiding the occurrence of faults and therefore the effect on SAIFI or feeder failure
rate was not observed.
On the other hand feeder automation resulted in a significant decrease in SAIFI and an
increase in MAIFI. An even greater impact on these indices was realised when feeder
automation was incorporated with distributed generation. The main reason behind this
would be the speed at which feeder automation locates and isolates faults and then
restores customers not directly impacted by the fault. This meant that the group of
customers not directly impacted by a fault, would experience a momentary interruption
instead of a sustain interruption, due to the implementation of feeder automation.
7.2 FEASIBILITY OF INVESTMENTS
Investing in the identified smart grid technologies and distributed generation is a highly capital
intensive venture. Though the smart grid technologies and distributed generation have a
positive impact on some reliability indices, they were found to have relatively long discounted
payback periods. The type of customers on the feeder directly affects the customer interruption
costs, and therefore also impacts the financial feasibility of investing in the different
technologies. In this case the customers were assumed to be residential (medium to high
income) and commercial retail customers. A different composition of customers and the
inclusion of other customer categories (industrial, agricultural), could well have resulted in a
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completely different outcome. More especially for industrial customers who generally have
much higher customer interruption costs than residential and commercial customers.
Another key factor which affected the discounted payback periods for the different cases, was
the value assigned to the net discount rate. A discount rate of 10 % [Khatib, 2010] was assumed
in the analysis. A lower net discount rate would have resulted in more favourable payback
periods. The opposite would apply to a higher discount rate.
Looking simply at the finances in the analysis only, it would be best to invest in new
transformers and replace the aged transformers, which are the cause of the high interruption
frequency. New transformers resulted in the highest savings in interruption costs, as well as the
shortest payback period. Even if the investor was to implement distributed generation and
smart grid technologies into the system, the aged transformers would eventually have to be
replaced due to their inability to perform altogether. This stresses the importance of addressing
the real issues affecting the system before investing in new and different technologies. Cases 3
and 4 particularly highlighted the impact of reducing the time to locate a fault on the system
interruption costs. A decrease of between 2 to 8 % from the base case was realised in these
cases respectively, with extensive payback periods ranging from 11 to 45 years.
The scenarios conducted in the sensitivity analysis pointed to a number of important outcomes.
In the first scenario the sensitivity of the interruption costs to the TTLF parameter was
examined, in order to determine how the TTLF affects the costs. The assumed TTLF value in the
base case was reduced to a quarter of its value and increased gradually up to four times it
original value. From the results of this sensitivity analysis it could be concluded that the TTLF has
a minimal impact of the customer interruption costs. The interruption costs are outage duration
dependent, and in the event of an interruption, the repair duration of the failed component is
much more significant than that of the TTLF. The second scenario of the sensitivity analysis
pointed to the effect repair times had on the interruption costs and hence the payback periods.
If the repair times can be kept short, the outage duration can be greatly reduced and this will
directly translate positively to the interruption costs. With or without smart grid techniques
electrical components on the electrical grid will fail and the ability of the repair crew to quickly
solve and repair or replace the faulted component can greatly reduce outage costs. In the third
scenario it was assumed that the base case contained non aged transformer operating in their
normal stage of operation. The effect of distance to fault estimators, fault passage indicators
and  feeder automation on this new base case was then investigated. The outcome of this
analysis highlighted that the high interruption costs experienced in the previously investigated
cases were as a result of the aged transformers and not the lack of modern infrastructure in the
form of smart grid technologies.
7.3 VALIDITY OF THE HYPOTHESIS PROPOSED
The analysis of this research study indentified fault passage indicators, distance to fault
estimators, feeder automation and distributed generation (solar PV) technologies, and
investigated their effect on four reliability indices i.e. SAIFI, SAIDI, feeder failure rate and
unavailability.
Page | 84
The research findings indicate that, the indentified smart grid technologies and distributed
generation can improve reliability indices dependent on outage duration such as SAIDI,
unavailability (U), EENS et cetera, and that they have no impact on the frequency of
interruptions. The findings also indicate that the frequency and number of interruptions of the
feeder among other things, is dependent on the age and state of the infrastructure and not on
the inclusion of fault passage indicators, distance to fault estimators, feeder automation or
distributed generation. One of the identified technologies i.e. feeder automation, does however
have an impact on SAIFI and MAIFI. Feeder automation contributed towards the reduction of
sustained interruptions, and this reduction translated to an increase in momentary interruption.
However feeder automation did not contribute towards the avoidance of interruptions or the
failure frequency on components on the system.
The hypothesis proposed in 1.4 stated that smart grid technologies and distributed generation
could beneficially improve the reliability of a distribution feeder in South Africa. The research
findings have indicated the partial validity of the proposed hypothesis, and that the hypothesis
would be better stated as follows:
Smart grid technologies used in conjunction with distributed generation could improve the
reliability of a distribution feeder, by reducing the outage duration of interruptions.
It is however also important to note that not all smart grid technologies on the market were
evaluated in this study and that the partially validity of the hypothesis, is based on the before
mentioned identified technologies.
7.4 FINAL REMARKS
The research analysis has found that the identified smart grid technologies, namely fault
passage indicators, distance to fault estimators and feeder automation and distributed
generation in the form of solar PV, have a positive impact on SAIDI and feeder unavailability and
no impact on SAIFI and feeder failure rate. The findings of this research study hold for the
assumptions in the design of the experiment. A key assumption which affected the findings is
that the identified smart grid technologies and distributed generation are perfectly reliable and
operate without fail. In reality, all components in a system are prone to failure, and hence the
inclusion of the failure probability of these components and system could yield a completely
different set of results.
The findings have highlighted that the identified smart grid technologies and distributed
generation have no impact on the frequency and rate of interruptions, but decrease the total
outage duration of the feeder. They also pinpointed that a network with aged infrastructure has
a much higher failure rate, and that this increase carries through to the increased outage
duration of the system. This therefore points to the importance of first addressing the root
causes of the problems in the network.
South Africa seeks to invest billions of Rands in the coming decades in order to improve and
upgrade its distribution network. In-depth analyses into the exact causes of poor performance
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need to be addressed. This research work has identified that smart grid technologies may not be
the solution to the problem of aged infrastructure faced by the distribution power industry of
the country.
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8.1.1 APPENDIX A
Appendix A contains an extract from a brochure released by Nortech [2013], a manufacturer of fault
passage indicators (FPI). This extracts gives a detailed description of how their fault passage indicators
operate and how they improve system reliability by reducing fault location time.
Figure A-8-1 Fault passage indicator operation [Nortech, 2013]
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8.1.2 APPENDIX B
Appendix B gives details of the RBTS test system.
Figure B-8-2 Complete RBTS Bus 6 [Billinton & Jonnavithula, 1996]
Table B-8-1Feeder Type and Lengths [Billinton & Jonnavithula, 1996]
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Table B-8-2 Reliability and System data[Allan et al., 1991]
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APPENDIX C
Appendix C contains the beta distributions of feeder failure rate and feeder unavailability for
case FPI_DFE, case feeder_auto, case DG and case feeder_auto_DG.
C.1 Case aged_tr and case FPI_DFE
i. Feeder failure rate
Figure C-8-3 Feeder failure rate comparison of case aged_tr and case FPI_DFE
Table C-8-3 Feeder failure rate of case aged_tr and case FPI_DFE
Feeder failure rate (λfeeder)(interruptions/year)
Percentile Case aged_tr
(Base case)
Case FPI_DFE Percentage
difference
10th 3.61 3.63 +0.5 %
50th 4.39 4.38 -0.2 %
90th 5.05 5.03 -0.4 %
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FPI & DFE: Alpha= 18.3539 Beta= 7.6985 C= 6.175
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ii. Feeder unavailability
Figure C-8-4Feeder unavailability comparison of case aged_tr and case FPI_DFE
Table C-8-4 Feeder unavailability of case aged_tr and case FPI_DFE
Feeder Unavailability ( Us) (hours/year)
Percentile Case aged_tr
(Base case)
Case FPI_DFE Percentage
difference
10th 0.28 0.16 -42.9 %
50th 22.48 20.46 -9.0 %
90th 157.40 158.79 +0.9 %
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FPI & DFE: Alpha= 0.33417 Beta= 1.9064 C= 350.8309
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C.2 Case aged_tr and case feeder_auto
i. Feeder failure rate
Figure C-8-5 Feeder failure rate comparison of case aged_tr and case feeder_auto
Table C-8-5Feeder failure rate of case aged_tr and case feeder_auto
Feeder failure rate (λfeeder)(interruptions/year)
Percentile Case aged_tr
(Base case)
Case feeder_auto Percentage
difference
10th 3.61 3.60 -0.3 %
50th 4.39 4.37 -0.5 %
90th 5.05 5.02 -0.6 %
0 1 2 3 4 5 6
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
Failure rate(interruptions/year)
P
ro
ba
bi
lit
y 
D
en
si
ty
Beta Distribution of Feeder Failure rate
aged tr (Base Case) : Alpha= 19.8987 Beta= 10.0573 C= 6.57
feeder auto: Alpha= 16.1159 Beta= 6.0841 C= 5.968
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ii. Feeder unavailability
Figure C-8-6 Feederunavailabilitycomparison of case aged_tr and case feeder_auto
Table C-8-6 Feeder unavailabilityrate of case aged_tr and case feeder_auto
Feeder Unavailability ( Us) (hours/year)
Percentile Case aged_tr
(Base case)
Case feeder_auto Percentage
difference
10th 0.28 0.06 -78.6 %
50th 22.48 15.98 -28.9 %
90th 157.40 154.05 -2.1 %
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feeder auto: Alpha= 0.28757 Beta= 1.5826 C= 315.6997
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C.3 Case aged_tr and case DG
i. Feeder failure rate
Figure C-8-7Feeder failure ratecomparison of case aged_tr and case DG
Table C-8-7Feeder failure rate of case aged_tr and case DG
Feeder failure rate (λfeeder)(interruptions/year)
Percentile Case aged_tr
(Base case)
Case DG Percentage
difference
10th 3.61 3.57 -1.1 %
50th 4.39 4.33 -1.3 %
90th 5.05 5.00 -0.9 %
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DG : Alpha= 18.3561 Beta= 8.4034 C= 6.28
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ii. Feeder unavailability
Figure C-8-8 Feederunavailabilitycomparison of case aged_tr and case DG
Table C-8-8 Feederunavailability of case aged_tr and case DG
Feeder Unavailability ( Us)(hours/year)
Percentile Case aged_tr
(Base case)
Case DG Percentage
difference
10th 0.28 0.11 -60.7 %
50th 22.48 19.43 -13.6 %
90th 157.40 160.83 +2.1 %
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DG : Alpha= 0.31206 Beta= 1.6059 C= 319.4534
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C.4 Case aged_tr and case Feeder_auto_DG
i. Feeder failure rate
Figure C-8-9 Feeder failure rate comparison of case aged_tr and case Feeder_auto_DG
Table C-8-9 Feeder failure rate of case aged_tr and case Feeder_auto_DG
Feeder failure rate (λfeeder)(interruptions/year)
Percentile Case aged_tr
(Base case)
Case
Feeder_auto_DG
Percentage
difference
10th 3.61 3.60 -0.3 %
50th 4.39 4.35 -0.9 %
90th 5.05 5.00 -0.9 %
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Feeder auto & DG  : Alpha= 17.2365 Beta= 6.5183 C= 5.947
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ii. Feeder unavailability
Figure C-8-10Feederunavailability comparison of case aged_tr and case Feeder_auto_DG
TableC-8-10Feederunavailability of case aged_tr and case Feeder_auto_DG
Feeder Unavailability ( Us)(hours/year)
Percentile Case aged_tr
(Base case)
Case
Feeder_auto_DG
Percentage
difference
10th 0.28 0.09 -67.3 %
50th 22.48 17.64 -21.5 %
90th 157.40 150.95 -4.1 %
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